a critique of FORMALIST URBAN PLANNING

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A thesis submitted to the
faculty of Wesleyan University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
with Departmental Honors in the College of Social Studies

For all emissaries of joy. Special thanks to my advisor, Joyce P. Jacobsen.

INTRODUCTION

Space matters when thinking about social interaction. Moreover, the study of society becomes more enlivened as we study the behavior of individuals across space and the influence of physical environments on social patterns. But what can social studies have to do with the forms of urban space?

While urban forms can reveal patterns of social behavior, planning theorists have largely prevented a reciprocal relationship between social studies and the practice of urban planning. These theorists have perennially re-affirmed the common notion of urban planning as a strategy for satisfying social objectives and interests. Though the social role of the urban planner has occasionally morphed because of political action, such as after the Civil Rights Movement, planning theorists have always held that urban planning is merely a function of social forces.[1]

As such, the ability of urban planners to transgress their institutional boundaries has been subordinated to the planning practice's narrowly defined social objectives. Furthermore, the internal necessity for broadening the field's perspective has been non-existent.[2] For example, the field of urban planning itself has only dealt with the inequalities of social systems as a political matter; planners have seldom taken criticism as an indication that widespread change in the basis of planning should occur (Fainstein 2001, 16 fn. 65). Accordingly, after the social protests of the 1960s, it was not long before economic development once again reigned supreme as the key objective in the planner's mode of action.

However, through the remainder of the 20th Century a cleavage between planning theory and practice developed. The intellectual trends associated with the politics of the Civil Rights Movement

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1 Susan Fainstein has surveyed planning theory for "stories" of the urban redevelopment process and developed her own synthesis of liberal, structuralist, and regime theory. But she too has been content with analyzing the "economic factors driving interest formation" in the redevelopment process. She also qualifies her position by stating: "I do not assume…that economic factors produce only one possible interpretation of interest or that economic situation (as opposed to community, race, and gender) is the only 'objective social interest' to be maximized" Fainstein 2001, 15). Nonetheless, Fainstein has still been primarily concerned with interest formation from a "structured position derived from the interaction between economic, communal, and ideological forces at a particular historic moment" (Ibid).

2 Alexander Garvin is representative of a number of scholars and planners who have refrained from transgressing the social boundaries of the planning practice. In the following passage, he argues that Robert Moses was a "complex" public figure. However, Garvin justifies this statement by noting how Moses conformed to social objectives. "Moses was far more complex than his critics admit. His renewal projects were neither simplistic slum clearance nor merely a spur to the filtering our of slum tenements…He conceived of [Le Corbusier's urbanism] to counter the middle-class exodus to the suburbs, and to help institutions in the area expand" (Garvin 1980, 77). Thus, even the most exceptional of city planners have been reactionary agents according to liberal planning theory.

continued to hold swagger in planning theory despite their loss of importance within the planning field. Several planning theorists analyzed the correlation between the outcomes of planning objectives and the perpetuation of social inequalities. Among them, Susan Fainstein questioned whether local officials could ever "produce growth with equity" (Ibid). Additionally, numerous other approaches were employed by theorists to answer this question. Sanders and Stone attempted to stress the principle that political success is worth more than economic success, and that planners should stress equity before economic growth. Yet, Fainstein and a veritable compendium of other urban scholars left the question of planning and inequality unanswered. They simply resolved the process of urban redevelopment with respect to only the "character of the urban regime" and the "unfolding of the process" (19). As such, they enacted both a nebulous and politically uncharged approach to planning.

To further explore urban planning's production of social inequalities, we must further temper Fainstein's scope and venture beyond the subsets of liberal, structuralist, and regime planning theory. Though these theories are helpful in linking social forces to the inequities of some planning outcomes, the disciplines of urban economics and architecture and urbanism are necessary when challenging urban planning's disproportionate social benefits. They help connect the inequities of development to the urban forms of development.

While past trends may have implied that urban planning has responded to movements in architecture and matters of economic efficiency, the responsive strategies have been superficially pursued. Urban forms can have meaning for the social studies, but planners have excessively adhered to the formal prescriptions of architecture and urbanism without regard to the social significance of form, even though the architectural discipline has analyzed urban forms as agents of social change and symbolic materials in the construction of cultural and social identity. Moreover, as we search for theoretical groundwork with which to advocate the importance of urban forms within the planning practice, urban economics presents itself as a usable framework for assigning and measuring the value of form. The synthesis of urbanism and urban economics also provides a new goal for urban planning's mode of action: obtaining the optimal formal development of cities with respect to the special character of local forms. Thus, interdisciplinary approaches in the social studies can frame the analysis of urban forms as a means to ameliorate the inefficacies of the urban planning practice.

A Brief History of Formalist Urban Planning

Urban planning gained acceptance in the United States as private property became increasingly subject to the public's interest. In the mid-1800s, landscape architects and city planners demolished villages and shantytowns and built neighborhoods around large parks and expansive boulevards. In Brooklyn, for instance, Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux's plans for Fort Greene and Prospect Parks acted as catalysts in the development and design of the surrounding neighborhoods.

In 1906, in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld takings for economic development and validated the promotion of economic development as a function of government and liberal planning (Kelo v. New London 2005, 14). However, despite the well-advertised success of Central Park as a stimulant to local property values, it seemed that planners idealized their importance to society in broader terms than simply associates to economic development. Their vision encompassed the design and the efficient development of the entire physical city. Affiliated with their vision was the method of large-scale, comprehensive planning harkened by the work of Olmsted and Vaux and the emerging practice of zoning. In 1926, the Supreme Court validated the right of municipalities to zone with Euclid v. Ambler, and the planner's idealistic objectives gained national credence. Thus, in its youthful stages, the American city planning practice was in touch with the social value of urban form and promisingly assigned fairly equal weight to issues of urban design, economic efficiency, and economic development.

Changes to the mode of urban planning could be blamed on political and economic forces. During the Great Depression, city planning became a function of the New Deal's fiscal and political legacy, which primarily used the institution of planning to achieve liberal objectives. Urban redevelopment was championed as a more politically and economically viable function for urban planning, even more so than the regulation of the use of land and the form of urban development.

Under these pressures, planners looked to past examples of liberal planning achievements, such as Central Park, and relied on enhancements of the public sphere in addition to large-scale redevelopment to increase labor demand and stimulate investment. Their plans were formulated with approximations of household preferences for local public goods, including the desire for open space.

However, while these plans worked to an extent (for instance, by helping clear slum areas and

reduce suburbanization), the urban forms of large-scale redevelopment produced enormous social costs associated with the effects of displacement and the widespread physical damage to local urban forms. These costs accumulated as political groups mounted campaigns against the federal government's Title 1 slum clearance program and its disproportionate benefits to the middle and upper classes.

When political-economic transformations in the early to late 1970s brought forth an era of fiscal restraints, new directions in liberal planning continued to take place. Decreased social expenditures combined with the political rebuking of large-scale redevelopment limited the use of the modern superblock as a planning device. However, urban planners were persistent in their pursuit of urban economic development and utilized modernist-inspired urban architectural forms to accommodate open space within congested central cities. Liberal urban design policy adopted "privately-owned public space" as large-scale development's concession to the public realm of the streets.

In New York, this policy brought sub-optimal outcomes from the use of urban land as it was often implemented without acknowledgement of the actual level of local demand for open public space. Furthermore, the policy's inefficiencies were generally indicative of modernism's universalizing of site and context. As such, the urban forms of new developments with "privately-owned public space" (i.e. the building, the block, the setbacks, and the various demarcations between private and public space) were built irrespectively of local forms, such as the public right-of-way comprised of pre-existent streets and sidewalks. Nevertheless, variations on this policy were upheld as the inefficiencies of "privately-owned public space" were seconded to liberal planning objectives of economic development, the prevention of suburban flight, and the image making initiatives to create newer, more modernized downtowns.

In the newest era of urban action known as entrepreneurialism, "global cities" and political-economic transformations have increased the availability of capital for urban real-estate development. Urban forms have been reified as a type of cultural capital—"symbolic capital," which affluent groups have attempted to integrate into their spatial and material practices.

Post-modern trends in urbanism have facilitated this mode in the social production of urban forms. Whereas modernism valued urban form as an agent for social change, post-modernism has held that iconographic urban forms have social value in their communicable power to edify selected

elements of social and cultural identity. Thus, urban form becomes a source of symbolic capital for both affluent groups and city planners who wish to physically and materially iterate conceptions of cultural status and institutional identity.

The planner's intended message for urban forms has always been more responsive to changing institutional and political goals than to theory and design. When Jane Jacobs's urbanism was incorporated into liberal planning objectives, the urban forms of the traditional city were recalled by citizens, preservation boards, and city officials and were suddenly worth preserving. However, though planners recognized the political demise of modernist urbanism and embraced its formal alternatives, the cleavage between urban design and local urban fabrics persisted. Essentially, planners created new urban realities but nonetheless maintained a number of formal references to the past.

Through the twenty-first century, the planner's sponsorship of urban form has depended on refined liberal and entrepreneurial agendas for increasing the city's inter-regional and international competitiveness. "Distinctive architectural elements" have become the media for image making and selling points for cities and developers alike. Frank Gehry's deconstructivist architecture has been adopted as a form of symbolic capital. His trademark curvilinear and multi-planar forms have bespoken the liberal planner's objective to motivate urban development through the material assertion of a culturally sophisticated civic identity.

However, as representations of liberal planning goals, abstracted urban forms will rarely ever meet local preferences for local public goods. As such, they become not only symbols of cultural and social identity but also symbols of the upper class's command over the urbanization process. Typically, these forms come in contact with local preferences in gentrifying neighborhoods, wherein the spatial practices of the upper classes deconstruct vulnerable local forms and subject them to the erection of new physical realities. This reality is an abstraction of the inequalities of urban development, liberal planning objectives, and architectural and urbanism principles.

A Road Map

Interdisciplinary approaches in the social studies can frame the analysis of urban forms as a means to ameliorate the inefficacies of the urban planning practice. The structure of this thesis is dependent upon the premise that an interdisciplinary approach to urban forms can increase

the urban planning field's responsibility to all social groups. This approach has been the result of three scholastic accomplishments. Architectural thinkers have explicated the social meaning of urban forms; critical Marxist theorists have identified the class conflict embedded in the forms of the physical urban environment; and urban economists have lent a framework for analyzing the optimality of new forms of urban development.

The approach of this thesis will be exemplified over three chapters.

Chapter 1 describes the mode of liberal urban planning which has historically perpetuated social inequalities. To this end, the chapter shows how urban planning could be seen as a function of social forces, which have brought political-economic transformations and changes in the methods of liberal urban planning.

Chapter 2 develops the interdisciplinary approach to urban forms and provides historical examples in which the three disciplines have coalesced to create effective and socially efficient planning policy. Additionally, the chapter also provides a critique of liberal urban planning's formalist policy-making.

Because Chapter 2 incorporates just three different architectural theories on urban forms, it only briefly exposes the social impact and meaning of urban form from within the discipline of architecture and urbanism. Yet these three theories (from Le Corbusier, Jane Jacobs, and Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter) are quite representative of the key points in the ideological shifts between modernism, anti-modernism, and post-modernism. Moreover, they also establish the possibility for activating the study of urban form as a source for change within urban planning.

Chapter 2 then moves on to discuss urban form in the context of urban economics and the concepts of Pareto optimality and local public goods. The argument pursued is that the socially optimal form of economic development can be theoretically approximated by examining local preferences for the urban forms that embody the supply of local public goods, such as open space. David Harvey's Marxist critical urban theory is then used to identify the spatial practices that perpetuate urbanization's inequities and to provide subject matter for a new interdisciplinary approach to planning.

Chapters 1 and 2 both lead up to Chapter 3's case study of the Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn, New York. The first section of the chapter documents the creation of the neighborhoods that surround the Atlantic Yards site. The second section connects the Atlantic Yards to social

objective interests, shifts in the modes of planning, and political-economic transformations. The stories of the Dodger's move to Los Angeles and the plans for the Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area reinforce the information provided in Chapter 1. They also further exemplify the inefficiencies of formalist liberal planning objectives, even when they are predicated on other veins of urban planning theory, like regime theory and structuralism. The third section ties in the interdisciplinary approach with an analysis of the plan and design guidelines of the Atlantic Yards development. The inter-urban conflict of spatial practices and the notion of neighborhood abstraction will be further explored at this point.

The concluding chapter will explore opportunities for implementing changes in the planning practice with an interdisciplinary approach to urban form.

CHAPTER 1: URBAN PLANNING AND FORMALISM

Liberal theory states that it is simply the actions of individuals pursuing their fundamental interests in self-preservation that gives rise to the division of labor, the market, and the subsequent rise of market cities. Urban development is "market driven" insofar as cities and the market itself are the products of rationally motivated individuals acting in terms of their own material self-interests.

Liberal theory, though, confines itself to analyzing the expression of these material interests within only the political and economic realms of life. Thus, the process of urban development can be studied in terms of the changes in the political and economic behavior of individuals due to the advent of new inventions and ideologies. Once people come together in cities and form civil societies, it follows that policies emanating from technological and ideological progress can be used to manipulate our political-economic behavior. In this manner, the administrators of civil society can govern the process of urban development by aligning the interests of individuals in hopes that development will then produce more desirable outcomes for the collectivized interests of society.

Unlike structuralists, liberal theorists do not analyze the urban implications of any of the more abstract historical theories of political economy, such as the Marxist material dialectic. Rather, liberals give ultimate primacy to how the economic behavior of individuals pursuing their material interests leads to the development of cities. Accordingly, the typical market city develops because three conditions are satisfied. First, agricultural surpluses can supply food to both the farmers and urban dwellers. Second, the variances in productivity that imply comparative advantage are great enough that transportation costs are offset and trade can occur. Third, scale economies in transportation mean that trade intermediaries are more efficient at transporting and marketing goods than either the farmer or the urban worker; these intermediaries cluster around central marketplaces. Firms form to further reduce the transaction costs involved with trade, and the clustering of firms and industry produces external economies of scale, or agglomerative economies, which allow one firm to benefit from the decisions made by other firms, such as when the production costs of one firm decrease as the output of another firm increases. This clustering also generates increases in labor productivity and allows employers to increase wages to attract more workers to the city. In summation, firms and people come together in cities and civil societies to further and protect their interests.

Within liberal theory, there are multiple visions for the role of the city planner. This thesis will explore three of those visions emanating from the disciplines of architecture and urban economists and from what Susan Fainstein has termed liberal planning theory (Fainstein 2001, 10).[3] As a theoretical guide for planners, liberal planning theory stresses the planner's role in furthering any society's objective interest in economic development.

In pursuance of this goal, liberal planning theory has developed policies to help governments spur economic growth by manipulating urban labor markets. Planners and municipal governments have found that increases in the demand for labor and the attraction of more firms to their cities can occur by improving the educational system, public services, business and residential infrastructures, and by cutting taxes. Crucial to liberal planning policy are urban redevelopment and the subsidy programs offered to lure export firms to the city. These programs may include tax abatement, industrial bonds, government loans, and land improvement programs.

States, politicians, and the courts have utilized liberal planning theory to argue that urban economic growth furthers the collective interests of society. For example, when the use of eminent domain has been tried before the Supreme Court, it has historically ruled that planning for economic development through the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is intended for the public's use and is a good thing in general (Kelo v. New London). The argument follows that planning for economic growth is beneficial to cities because it increases their intercity and international competitiveness and helps retain central city investment amidst suburbanization. Furthermore, the liberal argument for planning holds that governmental intervention in the urban development process is necessary to address the impact of technology on the attractiveness of cities and to protect the diversity of interests within pluralistic societies.

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3 Fainstein's own approach pulls from the incites of structuralist theory, but combines them with those of regime theory, which is formulated on how dominant ideologies, agendas, access networks, and latent power affects city planning and development. Regime theory's origins in the liberal theory is quite apparent; like neo-pluralist theory, it accepts individual choice as the basis for political action, but points to the role of the governing regime in shaping the preferences and interests of the populace. Fainstein states that "Regime theory, in its discussion of the social bases of conflict and cooperation in redevelopment, more easily accommodates racial differentiation and ideological forces than do most structuralist critiques. It detects structural biases within the political economic system of capitalism" that drive the planning process, but "it does not incorporate the forces creating that structure into its argument" (2001, 14).

However, as methods for critiquing the *modus operandi* of liberal planning's social inefficacy, neither regime theory or Fainstein's analyze the physical source of urban development's production of inequality: the form of development itself. As such they will only come again in this thesis covering the history of urban renewal at the Atlantic Yards.

Liberal planning theorists have confined their study of urban planning and development to the political and economic impacts of planning measures. For example, Alexander Garvin is representative of these theorists and the author of The American City: What Works, What Doesn't. In his book and in other planning reports, Garvin's method of evaluation has been to analyze planning strategies with liberal goals, such as the ability to generate a desired "private-market reaction" or garner political approval (Garvin 1996, xi; A. Garvin, pers. comm.). Garvin's approach is useful because it adheres to the liberal argument for urban planning and helps to satisfy the liberal goals that planners and politicians bring to governing the urban development process. Garvin and others have accepted that the individuals in charge of the planning process champion economic development and politically favorable outcomes, not economic efficiency or good design, as the benchmarks for good planning.

Michael Sorkin, an urban design critic, has also admitted this phenomenon in the planning process. To him, planning has become a further "triumph for neo-liberal economics." Accordingly, "In New York—where the municipal leadership evaluates all development by the single metric of real estate prices—the Planning Department has largely refashioned itself as the Bureau of Urban Design, executor of policies emanating from the Deputy Mayor for Economic Development, the city's actual director of planning" (Sorkin 2006, 9). There are also clear affinities between Garvin and Sorkin's perspectives on the decision-making process in the top tiers of the planning hierarchy; both emphasize the priority of economic and political concerns.

Throughout the twentieth century, planning in American cities has been a function for realizing goals along these lines. The economic goal to stimulate development has remained an essential element of the liberal basis for planning, even though the methods for achieving this goal have changed because of transformations in economic ideas and institutions. In contrast, political transformations and the rise of pluralistic society have changed both the methods of city planning and the political agendas to which planning has typically conformed. This chapter will document how the practice of urban planning has changed throughout the twentieth century in response to political-economic transformations in what we may call the interests of society.

Urban Redevelopment

Throughout the history of the urban planning practice, urban redevelopment has emerged as

an effective mechanism for generating economic development and expressing political interests. In its early years, redevelopment and planning were small-scale efforts, such as park planning and public works.

In the mid-nineteenth century, civic groups began to realize the economic potential of converting land into parks. In both Chicago and New York City, these groups either pressured the government into setting aside parkland or formed commissions to develop parklands themselves. In Chicago, civic leaders, real estate developers, and sanitarian reformers urged the Illinois General Assembly to pass bills creating the South, West, and Lincoln Park commissions of 1869. These agencies were overseen by the governor of Illinois and were given the wide discretionary powers to buy and condemn land and to assess and collect taxes in support of park construction. Significantly, the main source of financing for these agencies came from real estate developers noting in 1869 that New York City's Central Park "'had hardly been staked out before the hoped-for rise in the value of the surrounding lots began, and to-day that rise has reached a point beyond the wildest expectation'" (Holt 1996,179).

The New York City experience with parks and public works also documents how these issues have been presented and manipulated to different ends. The reformers of the highly politicized early 20th century battle to solve New York's land and housing problems were founded on the political and real estate opportunities offered by redevelopment. In contrast, the later public servants of New Deal policies were anxious to put people back to work and address the popular demands for public works improvements and redevelopment.

In 1904, New York City created a City Improvement Commission and soon after passed the Small Parks Act. Reflecting on more than a decade of progressive city planning, Nelson P. Lewis, in The Planning of the Modern City, commented that three years after the Commission was created it "presented a report, accompanied by a great number of plans involving radical changes…the cost of acquiring land for which, with the damage to existing buildings, but with no allowance for construction, was estimated to be nearly one hundred millions of dollars" (Lewis 1916, 36-37).

The focus of the Improvement Commission and the Small Parks Act was Lower Manhattan. In the early twentieth century, Manhattan's Lower East Side was jam-packed with hundreds of dumbbell tenements. As a vibrant form of open space, the streets and sidewalks played host to the social activity surrounding these immigrant and lower-class residential enclaves. Yet, as

thoroughfares, the streets were not as useful. And, as public spaces, the streets were neither sanitary nor endowed with civic grandeur and order. The Small Parks Act partially relieved the congestion of the streets by creating William H. Seward Park, Hamilton Fish Park, and Columbus Park, by demolishing approximately 190 tenements, and, in turn, displacing 13,300 residents (Schwartz 1993, 13). The extension of 7th Avenue through Greenwich Village to connect with Varick Street to the south, along with the rapid transit line constructed at the same time, displaced 5,000 residents whereby the cost of acquiring the property was more than $8,200,000 (Lewis 1916, 37).

These city planning measures were rooted in the liberalism of land reform and were driven by social interests in the potential of economic development offered by alternative uses of tenement-occupied land. Reformers had been convinced that the public would benefit more from city parks, wider streets, and elegant approaches to East River bridges rather than from another tenement houses for the poor. Members of the City Improvement Commission and the Municipal Art Society saw the benefits that Central Park brought to uptown Manhattan. They also recognized the public revenues to be gained from "excess condemnation," the municipal sale of surplus land taken for public improvements (Schwartz 1993, 12-13). By mid-century, the liberal basis for planning was well engrained in the debate over urban planning policy. In 1940, New York's City Planning Commission held that "checking deterioration in the older sections and rehabilitating slum areas is not only socially desirable; it has become imperative if the city is to maintain a solvent fiscal position" (The City of New York 1940, 322).

Moreover, the redevelopment projects of this era were routinely presented under the political guise of improving public health. Yet, the political mission of the Tenement House Reform and the City Improvement Commission was heavily dependent upon economic considerations. In 1896, Jacob Riis, co-founder of the Tenement House Reform movement, and his associates incorporated as the City and Suburban Homes Company with Elgin Gould as their president and with the mission to exemplify "practical housing reform in the United States." In his essay, "The Housing Problem in Great Cities," Gould reviewed the recent Tenement House Exhibition. "The feature which aroused… the most contemptuous interest" was the model of a tenement block that would eventually be torn down to make way for a Manhattan Bridge approach. "There is not a bath in the entire block," he reported, "and only 40 [out of 605] apartments were supplied with hot water." Yet, the bottom line was that "the rental derived from this block, including the shops, amounts in round numbers to

$114,000 a year" (Gould 1900, 382). Though other groups were not as conspicuous, the City and Suburban Homes Company's approach to public health was clear: "The broad, underlying principle on which the company is founded is that the housing problem can only be solved by economic methods" (390).

The Icon of Planning: Robert Moses

> Caro called Moses "American's greatest builder"…The photographs [of his projects] are so beautiful that they make you yearn for a time when enhancing the public realm was a serious calling….In an era when almost any project can be held up for years by public hearings and reviews by community boards, community groups, civic groups, and planning commissions, not to mention the courts, it is hard not to feel a certain nostalgic tug for Moses's method of building by decree. (Goldberger 2007, 83-85)

The site-by-site redevelopments of the Tenement House reformers were small in scope and had no grasp of New York's destiny as a vast metropolis. Contrarily, the 1916 Board of Estimate legally accommodated for New York's future by authoring regulations to which every building erected in each of the five boroughs would have to conform.[4] Robert Moses later helped to further broaden the scope of planning in the City through the redevelopment and modernization of its full extents. As one New Yorker critic wrote, "Moses's problem was that he couldn't take his eye off the big picture. He was so in tune with New York's vastness that he had no patience for anything small within it" (83).

To Moses, even the small projects he undertook, including the hundreds of parks and playgrounds across the five boroughs, were only meaningful insofar as they formed a network of public works across the entire City of New York. But part of his effectiveness was that the master builder thought about every single detail of every project he undertook, from the intricacies of all applicable laws to the sculptural programs of every park bath and washhouse. The sum of his efforts was a large-scale concern for the public interest of the City and the well being of all New Yorkers. It was this concern over the larger public interest that would convince him that his most contentious projects were perfectly designed, even though they would bulldoze through neighborhoods and destroy historical monuments in their wake, as was the plan for his Brooklyn-Battery Bridge. Moreover, if anyone can say that Robert Moses's fall from power was an indication of his failure as a public servant, it was only because he was sometimes unwilling to listen. While his early New York

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4 The Board of Estimate is a municipal approval board for all public expenditures in New York City. It was responsible for passing the 1916 Zoning Resolution.

City projects were belayed by the overwhelming solidarity of the New Deal, his later projects would violently collide with the bastions of community and special interest groups.

When Robert Moses first descended upon the island of Manhattan he had a career's worth of experience in the politics of public works. By 1929, Moses had gained notoriety by bolstering the advocacy movements for open space and roads by creating the first system of state parks and highways for the State of New York. The political triumph of his accomplishment was affirmed in the Governor's State of the State address in 1929, when Governor Roosevelt declared: "The development of our Statewide park and parkway system has, I think, ceased to be a matter of political controversy" (New York Times, January 3, 1929).

Secondly, New York City was in the Great Depression when Mayor Fiorella Laguarida appointed Moses Commissioner of Parks in 1933. Moses was to spearhead populist programs for public works all across the City—an assignment attached to the interests of thousands of unemployed workers, not to mention the scores of New Yorkers demanding more parks, open space, and the remediation of the neighborhood effects of depression-era urban blight. Thus, Moses rose to power as a city planner because he effectively facilitated the expression of emerging political and economic ideological interests through urban planning and redevelopment.

The park situation in New York City in the early 1930s was aggravating to reformers. There was a dearth of park space and no city-wide plan to address the problem, which was largely due to the conflicts of interest between the city and the boroughs. On July 11th, 1929, the Queens Chamber of Commerce expressed this political sentiment when the passed two resolutions: one protesting the City's sale of four open parcels of land used for recreation, and the other endorsing the "idea of one park commissioner for the entire city and park planning commissions for each borough" (New York Times, July 12, 1929). Even where there was a push for parks improvement, there were formidable political obstacles due to the organization of municipal government, and in some cases, political corruption. For instance, while Brooklyn's Park Commissioner, James J. Brown, earned $1,071,713 for himself from funds earmarked for public parks, weeds overran many of the City's finest parks (Caro 1974, 332-334).

Overall, in 1932 only 14,827 acres, or 7.28 percent of the city's total area, had been set aside for the recreation of its citizens. This percentage was smaller than the amount set aside for recreation in all of the other ten largest cities in the United States (336). Almost half of the 14,827

acres was not designated as park space, and most of this land was located in places where it was least demanded. For example, 3,256 of those acres were undeveloped (and partially underwater) marshlands in Brooklyn and Staten Island. An additional 2,954 acres, which had been added to the total between 1926 and 1929, was located in the peripheries of Queens and Staten Island (New York Times, October 31, 1929).

In 1929, responding to a wash of complaints against the Walker Administration's parks program, the President of New York City Parks Association, Nathan Straus Jr., cited the 23 percent increase in park areas and articulated the fiscal ideology behind the City's approach to parks:

> People want to buy parks today in Manhattan. It is too late. No land for parks is available. Some of us who look ahead want to provide for the future by buying parks in the outlying boroughs of Queens and Richmond, for which an extensive program of park purchases is contemplated by the Park Association and other civic bodies for the next four years (Ibid).

Coupled with the decreases in transportation costs because of the automobile and a growing highway infrastructure, this policy must have aided the intensity of later suburbanization patterns, in addition to overlooking the local nature of public goods. In the meantime, the allocation of park space at the fringes of outlying boroughs meant that criticisms of the City's under provision of local park space only persisted.

Urban reformers wanted more park space in the most congested neighborhoods to prevent suburbanization towards the outskirts of town. Park advocates were speaking widely about the need for more parks. In 1938, the National Parks Service released its study on the Recreational Use of Land in the United States, which included a helpful guide for park acreage standards specifying that in cities with more than 10,000 people 10 park acres were needed per 1000 people (National Parks Service 1938). If these specifications had been followed, in 1930 about half of the City's 154,000 acres of usable land area (excluding streets and major bodies of water) would have been devoted to parks (New York City Department of Planning 2007). Obviously these figures were impractical; reformers were inventing a demand for parks that conformed to the politicized ideologies on urban living.

Moses was able to capitalize politically on the park advocacy movement through his vest-pocket park system. In 1934, nodding to his undeniable effectiveness as a planner, newly elected Mayor Fiorella Laguardia appointed Moses the Commissioner of Parks. His first act as

commissioner, and the first bill submitted to the State Legislature by the La Guardia administration, was a bill Moses wrote himself that consolidated the park departments and set forth the powers he would have in office (Caro 1974, 360-362). Moses was immediately productive. By May 1st of 1934, seventeen hundred out of eighteen hundred renovation projects on the City's monuments, parks, and playgrounds had been completed utilizing the labor of more than 68,000 men working under the Civil Works Administration and funds from both the Federal Emergency Relief and Public Works Administrations (363, 372). Also by May, after transferring the titles of all city-owned land to the Park Department, Moses had obtained enough unused parcels of land in slum areas to develop sixty-nine separate small-park and playground sites (375). One of those larger parks, Sara Roosevelt Park, was built on the site of the failed "Chrystie-Forsyth Development" on the Lower East Side. The majority of parks, though, were "vest pocket parks," previously "unappropriated" pieces of land, often smaller than 1 acre (Caro, 376; Ballon, Jackson, 2007). Until 1934 New York and the entirety of its environs had only 119 playgrounds; in a single year Moses had increased that number by 50 percent, and by 700 percent by the time he lost his parks commissioner appointment in 1960 (Ballon, Jackson 2007).

Despite the proliferation of vest-pocket parks, it took only a couple of years for Moses to realize their ineffectiveness as a redevelopment tool. Moses standardized the design of his playgrounds and always had available plans for WPA funds, but after the Congress discontinued the CWA, the costs of maintenance and upkeep for his small parks and playgrounds revealed themselves as deterrents to seeking more small parks. Because of drunkards and vandals, many of the park fixtures that made Moses' parks so special (such as their tastefully landscaped perimeters) were removed making the parks both undesirable and somewhat unsafe.[5] After just two years of operation, the vest-pocket park program was near death. In 1936, the Transportation Board was willing to donate several small, abandoned plots of land to the program, but Moses refused them, claiming that they were "'of no use to [Parks] Department'" (Caro 1974, 490). Three acres,

5 Caro eloquently describes the park scene: "Drunks crept into the tunnel segments at night and fell asleep, to be discovered by children the next morning sleeping in their own vomit. The tunnel segments had to be removed. Drunks wandered into the striped guardhouse "play booths" during the day and urinated in them. Perverts used them as hiding places from which they could watch the playing little girls and boys at close range and masturbate. Vandals pried loose the light lumber out of which the play booths were constructed. The play booths had to be removed. Then the drunks slept and the perverts hid in the trees and shrubbery behind the benches, so this landscaping had to be removed…Critics might rage that the playgrounds now resembled animal cages; Moses saw that resemblance himself; he just felt that there was nothing he could do about it" (Caro 1974, 488).

Moses claimed, was the smallest practical area for an effective park (492). The costs of a small park remained high, while the likelihood of positive externalities decreased, rendering small park development in densely populated areas too expensive.

Political-Economic Restructuring

The economic ideas that rose to predominance after the Great Depression transformed both the economic system of the United States and the political-economic interest behind the liberal justification for planning. In response to the destabilization and uncertainty that surrounded the Great Depression, the federal government began exploring redistributive policies to remove the psychological apprehensions regarding private investment. John Maynard Keynes brought political acceptance to the policy that the government could and should control the national economy through active market manipulation. The economic historian Mark Blyth elaborated on these ideas:

> The private economy as a whole was perceived as inherently unstable and incapable of delivering socially optimal outcomes. In particular, massive and prolonged unemployment was seen to be an inevitable outcome of the capitalist process. In light of these new ideas, the state had a duty to socialize the conditions of investment to minimize the inherent instability of the business cycle and its associated unemployment. (Blyth 2002, 5).

The emergence of Keynesian economic thought in U.S. capitalist development redefined the process of urban planning. Publicly sponsored urban development and federal urban renewal programs emerged as politically acceptable testing grounds for the Keynesian goal of drawing together large sources of capital through government intervention in order to stimulate growth and provide for an expanded social welfare net. These federal programs perpetuated urban planning's usefulness as a governmental mechanism for stimulating economic growth.

To accommodate the economic transformations that occurred between the 1930s and 1940s, city governments reorganized their finances and increased expenditures. In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, city officials found that expanding the scope of taxation to include income and sales taxes could partially free their Depression-era revenue restraints. Though property taxes produced over 60 percent of New York City's revenues in 1945, the share of income and sales taxes in these revenues grew by 10 percent in just 5 years between 1945 and 1950 (Teaford 1990, 76). As a result of these new forms of taxation and other forms of financing (such as the postwar bond market), capital expenditures by local governments rose sevenfold from 1944 to 1951 (Altshuler and

Luberoff 2003, 12-13).

Spending on urban renewal during this time also skyrocketed. Congress appropriated a billion dollars for urban planning and renewal programs when it passed the U.S. Housing Act and Title 1 Slum Clearance Act of 1949 (Caro 1974, 12). By 1957, cities nationwide had spent $400 billion on urban redevelopment. The majority of this spending was in New York, where $267 billion had been spent on urban renewal by 1957. By 1958, Robert Moses had secured $34 billion in federally sponsored urban renewal capital grants by 1958. The next city after New York, Chicago, received $13 billion; and the third city, Baltimore, received under $5 billion—measly in comparison to New York (Teaford 1990, 107).[6]

The removal of inner-city blight to reverse the suburban sprawl of capital and investment was at the forefront of national politics when the U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems made its case for urban renewal in 1949, reporting that the "'primary purpose of Federal aid in this field (of urban renewal)…is to help remove the impact of the slums on human lives rather than simply to assist in the redevelopment or rebuilding of cities'" (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989, 23). Urban renewal and slum clearance programs became large sources of public expenditures, amounting to $400 billion by 1958. The liberal basis planning was declared to be a matter of the public interest. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Berman v. Parker that eminent domain takings for large-scale redevelopment programs served the public "purpose of transforming a blighted area into a "well-balanced" community" (Kelo, 545 U.S. 14). Thus, urban redevelopment initially acted as populist method for public investment and economic development.

Before the U.S. Congress passed the Housing Act in 1949, urban redevelopment had already gained liberal acceptance in a number of states and cities, wherein redevelopment authorities had already sprung to life. In the years prior, state legislatures in New York, Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Missouri authorized redevelopment authorities to exercise the power of eminent domain in assembling large tracts of blighted land and property for private development. These authorities predated the 1949 Housing Act, which drastically expanded the breadth of eminent domain for enterprising city planners (Teaford 1990, 106-107).

After 1949, the Housing Act granted authority to all governments to condemn and bulldoze

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6 This provides one argument for situating the majority of this thesis in New York City. Others arguments include New York's general spearheading of new proporgrams and mechanisms for urban planning (i.e. Central Park, design zoning, and housing policy).

the buildings and streets of blighted neighborhoods, clear the rubble, and sell the improved land with new streets and infrastructure to a private developer at a 60 percent write down. Under the act's Title I program two thirds of any city's renewal expenses were to be underwritten by a direct cash subsidy from the federal government that was intended for housing-related redevelopments (Anderson 1964, 2-3). The original act sought to fund only housing-related slum clearance projects, but, by 1954, the rising political opposition to large-scale redevelopment expanded the possibilities for funding in order to refocus redevelopment on rehabilitation (Ballon, Jackson 2007).

Despite the high level of urban renewal capital grants dispersed across the United States, only a few of the most recognized large-scale developments of this period were financed with federal funding. The other projects came to fruition through a reliance on the liberal cooperation structures between local authorities and private interests that had been established in the early years of urban planning. For example, Pittsburgh's Gateway Center, Philadelphia's Penn Center, and Boston's Back Bay were built with little to no federal funds (Teaford 1990). Thus, when the federal urban renewal programs were initiated, fiscal and political economic changes at the state and local levels had already taken place. The associated transformations in ideologies and institutions further enhanced the mechanisms for governing urban development.

Suburbanization and Large-Scale Redevelopment

In the late 1940s Moses, at the forefront of national trends in urban planning, devoted many of his planning objectives to large-scale redevelopment. While his earlier vest-pocket projects aimed to meet political demands for more urban open space, his large-scale projects found political support amongst the recently created local and federally sponsored slum clearance programs. Though, small vest-pocket parks were no match for the abundance of land and open space to be found outside of city centers, Moses and other planners still considered open space as a critical element in retaining the middle class. But, through the 1930s and 40s, even the neighborhoods with an abundance of park and open space (e.g. the Upper West Side) were deteriorating and new urban housing developments promising open space were often unprofitable—signifying that other elements were making central cities less attractive than newly built suburban developments. As a result, urban blight emerged as a subject of national political attention, and Robert Moses was poised to offer New York City as the testing grounds for the enactment of federal and local blight

removal and slum clearance programs. To accomplish the two-part goal of improving blighted parcels of land and increasing the supply of open space in the central city, Moses utilized physical models designed around Le Corbusier's principles of modern functionalist urbanism.

When Moses came to New York City, the rising middle class was leaving Manhattan and traveling on the master builder's highways and parkways to the outer boroughs and surrounding suburbs (Jacobs 1961, 282). From 1910 to 1930, Manhattan's population declined steadily from 2.3 million, and despite a modest rise through the 1930s it dropped to 1.9 million in 1940. In contrast, the total population of New York grew by over 1 million between 1920 and 1930, and reached 7,454,995 by 1940, representing growth in only the outer boroughs (Stern, et al. 1995, 13). The suburbs were also getting bigger. In 1920, around 3.5 million people lived in New York's suburban regions, but by 1940 the number had risen to 4.5 million. Incentivized by decreases in transportation costs, the population in Long Island's Nassau County rose by 200,000 in the decade following the completion of Moses's Southern State Parkway (Caro 1974, 899). By 1957, the population of Nassau County had grown to 1.3 million (Stern, et al. 1995, 15).

As Parks Commissioner, Chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, member of the City Planning Commission, New York City Construction Coordinator, and chairman of the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance, it was Robert Moses's job to balance the suburbanization of the middle class with reinvestment in the central city. In 1948, Moses organized the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance, which surveyed the city and found 9,000 slum acres requiring redevelopment. To undertake this process the Committee developed a formula that incorporated private investment, economies of scale, and housing sorting theories. The City would propose the sites and underwrite the sell of the land to a private developer, who would hopefully undertake construction and make a profit. In conjunction with the desire to eliminate slums, the City sponsored the projects as a planning tool to gain high tax returns and produce higher rents on land. To this end, Moses and his Committee knew that only large-scale projects could have the desired effects, and they established a twelve-acre minimum for their projects. Furthermore, they theorized that the effects of their projects, which were marketed towards middle incomes, would allow for more slum clearance after poor families upgraded their housing. To attract residents, these redevelopments promised a different form of urban amenities, wherein the congestion of the city grid was abandoned for semi-public open spaces and suburban-style commercial strips (Garvin 1980, 76-77).

Moses's use of the ideal forms of functionalist urbanism and Le Corbusier's The City of Tomorrow was explicit. Moses and other city planners followed Le Corbusier's heading that it was a "simple matter to build urban dwellings away from the streets, with small internal courtyards and with windows looking on to large parks" (Le Corbusier 1971, 167). Not only did these organizational principles apply to the residential component of functionalist urbanism, they also emerged as design guidelines for what was built by New York City's Slum Clearance Committee. Blighted areas could be redeveloped with new and exciting architectural forms, while open space could be integrated into dense urban fabrics in the hopes that it could be marketed as a new form of living for the urban middle-class. Therefore, the superblock form that originated from Le Corbusier's urbanism was combined with the politicized slum clearance movement because it showed an inherent economic rational for redeveloping deteriorating central cities into attractive places to live. When smaller-scale, residential superblocks presented problems for developers, Moses pursued larger-scale, mixed-use projects to reduce the risks of private investment in publicly sponsored slum clearance programs.

Washington Square Village

After the initial developer dropped out, and in the face of widespread criticism from local citizens, Moses bullied the plans for the Title 1 Washington Square South project through the courts and the Board of Estimate in January 1954 (New York Times, January 27, 1954). On the drawing boards the project was designed around Le Corbusier's L'Unite D'Habitation: three modern "super slabs," each nearly 600 feet long and luxuriously housing 2,000 families with a vast open space between each of them. An advertising brochure from the developer, Wolf and Tishman, promised a "new kind of urban living" (Ballon, Jackson 2007). Moses also planned for traffic improvements, including the extension of Fifth Avenue through Washington Square to connect with the new Manhattan-Brooklyn connection at Battery Park.

But, when the buildings were built, the developer skimped on the interior designs, and tenants quit leasing units. The developers, Tishman and Wolf, abandoned the project after the demand for the rentals fell and the costs of completion rose; left one slab un-built; and sold the development to New York University (Stern, et al. 1995, 227-228). Solidifying the failure of the single-use project, 324 tenants brought suit in 1962 against the developer (Wolf), the rental agent (Edna Manoville), and

the land owner (NYU)—seeking $9 million in damages, alleging they were induced to sign leases based on misrepresentations "'in pursuance of and in furtherance of a conspiracy.'" The New York Times reported that "the asserted misrepresentations included promises of 'luxury living' in three buildings 'then rising,' bordered by 'gardens on all sides'" (New York Times, June 24, 1962). The open space and gardens festered while unvisited: the space was too private to welcome the public, and the residents could not use their garden views to justify the costs of their "'old-fashioned refrigerators, dangerous stoves, [and] under-sized bathtubs.'"

Although Washington Square South suffered because its amenities lacked appeal, in the end, it did not fail as a component of Moses's and New York University's cooperative plan to redevelop Greenwich Village through institutional expansion. Between 1960 and 2000 there were over 9,000 new housing units built in the area, and NYU increased its property holdings by more than 50 percent during the same period, despite also having recently sold its University Heights campus in the Bronx (U.S. Census Data; New York Times, April 19, 2001). As the University was increasing its holdings in the Village, households were moving in: Over 45,000 households moved into the community district between 1970 and 2000 (U.S.Census Data 2000). While the larger plans for NYU expansion were not written into the Washington Square Village Title I proposal, the project gave NYU a foothold on which to build.[7]

Manhattantown

At Manhattantown, two scandals gave even more reason for the Slum Clearance Committee to reformulate its approach to the process and physical model for redevelopment. The first involved the initial developer, Manhattantown Inc., whose exploits of loopholes in the City' redevelopment process caught the ire of the program's most astute critics. At all of the Slum Clearance sites, after the City transferred title to the property, the sponsor was entitled to collect rent from the slum tenants. Instead of applying the rent roll towards the equity needed to finance the redevelopment project, for six years Manhattantown Inc. simply continued to collect rents and never proceeded with

7 From the get-go there was opposition to NYU's "take-over" of the neighborhood. According to the *Village Voice*, Jane Jacobs, Louis Mumford, and a myriad of tenants' groups, historic preservationists, and neighborhood organizations, Washington Square Village did not belong near the cozy confines of Washington Square Park. The Board of Estimate, the municipal organ responsible for approving all slum clearance programs, was also spilt on the matter; the project narrowly won approval by a 4 to 3 vote. While it was part of an overall successful redevelopment project, Washington Square Village had the unintentional consequence of further evoking his opposition, which already formed around his West Side Highway, Cross-Bronx Expressway, and Battery Bridge projects.

the project. After scandal ensued, Moses scurried to find another developer, William Zeckendorf, to bail out the Slum Clearance Committee. Renamed West Park Village, Zeckendorf completed the project successfully, notwithstanding the after-effects of displacement.

Moses' disregard for his projects' displacement programs also garnered widespread local scrutiny. Two men, Lawrence Orton and Walter Fried, began investigating the displacement effects of the Manhattantown Title 1 project in the early 1950s. Moses had promised that more than a quarter of the families previously living on the site—998 out of 3,628—would have a place to live in the proposed development. However, when conducting research on the Title 1 program for the City Planning Commission, Orton had not encountered even one displaced tenant who could afford the rental price of the new units (Caro 1974, 963). Fried, a local resident and regional administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, confirmed Orton's findings. Through the winter and spring of 1952 and 1953, Fried began noticing subtle changes in his Upper West Side neighborhood, what had been a middle-class stronghold with brownstone-lined streets. Searching for a reason for the increase in garbage cans outside each row-house and the striking increases in deteriorated buildings, "hopheads," and "alcoholics," Fried observed that the blighting of his neighborhood was spreading south from Manhattantown in a process that Caro would later summarize in The Power Broker: "A project designed—at immense cost—to clear up a localized, six-block-square slum infection was instead causing that infection to spread over many more than six other blocks" (Caro 1974, 963-965).

Neighborhood conditions made it evident that though the federal law specified that the city was to be in charge of relocation at Title 1 renewal sites, Moses illegally left the chore to the developers. Yet, the developer hardly did anything for the residents other than hand them eviction notices. The displaced residents could not afford housing in the project and were left to linger down the streets of Fried's Upper West Side neighborhood.

Lincoln Center

In 1956, Moses returned to the Upper West Side with his plans for the Lincoln Square Title 1 program—in no small part an effort to redress the blight moving southward from Manhattantown, revitalize the tenement area known from scenes of West Side Story, and find new homes for the Metropolitan Opera Company and the New York Philharmonic. In making the Lincoln Square

Planning Report of the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance public, Mr. Moses told the New York Times: "The redevelopment of this area with improvements set forth is of vital importance to the city and to the entire West Side of Manhattan." The report itself also noted that "most of the buildings in the predominantly residential area were Old Law tenements in various stages of obsolescence" (New York Times, May 28, 1956). Instead of rehabilitating the housing stock with the federal Title 1 funds, Moses opted for demolition and redevelopment. The New York Times further reported:

> The project calls for the demolition of all but half a dozen buildings in an area of eighteen city blocks north and west of the Coliseum at Columbus Circle. In that area of fifty-three acres there is to arise a gleaming new city within a city of 4,120 apartments to rent at an average of $47.50 a room, shopping zones, a hotel, an office center, a major theatre district, Fordham University's Manhattan center and campus, and a music and arts center.[8]

In the meantime, criticisms mounted over the scandal at Manhattantown and the Title 1 program in general. Moses' renewal program drew fierce opposition from four groups in particular—the families displaced by his developments, the reform groups who represented these groups, and the urbanists who decried Moses' treatment of existing urban fabrics. Though economically viable, the political support for his projects faded with the criticisms of these groups. In 1959, Mayor Wagner commissioned a study of the displacement plans of the Slum Committee and Housing Authority. In the same year, the same sources of opposition and criticism led the federal government to abandon the Title I program for the Community Renewal Program; and Moses lost (or left) his posts as Parks Commissioner, Construction Coordinator, City Planning Commission member, and Chairman of the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance. Lincoln Center was among his last opportunities to exercise his understanding of the social interests, which gave rise to his function as an urban planner.

Pittsburgh's Gateway Center

New York was not the only American city to discover the economic benefits and political favorability of large-scale redevelopment at mid-century. Pittsburgh reformers began their city's era

8 Moses would also later recognize the need to incorporate open space into the project's plan, and successfully vouched for the inclusion of Damrosch Park on the southwest corner of the Lincoln Center block (Caro 1974, 1157; Schwartz 1993, 284). The park was only 2.34 acres—0.66 acres smaller than Moses standard from 1938. This illustrates a clear shift in his thinking as a planner. We can speculate that Moses had come to the conclusion that more park space was not the amenity that would ultimately revitalize the area.

of urban redevelopment in much the same way as New York: They hired Robert Moses. In 1938, the Municipal Planning Association revived itself as the Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association and asked Moses to design an Arterial Plan for Pittsburgh. In addition to $38 million in highway improvements, Moses proposed an $8 million slum clearance redevelopment project at Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle, an area at the point of confluence between the Ohio and Allegeheny Rivers, home in the 1930s to a deteriorated railroad yard and depreciating real estate values (Crowley 2005, 53). In conjunction with the PRPA, the Golden Triangle Division of the Chamber of Commerce viewed the Golden Triangle's physical transformation as essential in attracting new firms and keeping the pre-existing firms from leaving (Crowley 2005, 37).

The initial strides towards redevelopment in Pittsburgh were also partly conceived as matter of public health. In July 1941, the City Council acknowledged the public problem of air pollution by passing a strong antismoke ordinance that would require firms to remove impurities from the exhaustive by-products of their manufacturing processes. The ordinance was drafted to become effective in the fall of 1943, but because the war placed enormous demands on the Pittsburgh steel industries, the ordinance was temporarily neglected, allowing the smoke pollution to intensify. The war's exploitation of Pittsburgh for its steel, also meant that many steel plants were in desperate need of renewal. But there was no response from the city to deal with these problems. In 1946, "It was a city where there had been almost nothing new in public or private amenities since before the stock market collapse of 1929" (Thomas 1999, 52).

In the meantime, reformers from the PRPA and Richard King Mellon realized that "smoky Pittsburgh" would only continue to repulse new firms. In 1943, they joined forces to create the Allegheny Conference on Postwar Community Planning to address the problems of flood control, smoke control, and downtown redevelopment. The organization supported an alliance between business and government under the presumption that public powers were needed to further private economic objectives (Thomas 1999, 52). And by 1951, the joint interests of business and government had succeeded in reviving both the smoke ordinance and the old redevelopment plans for the Golden Triangle under the Urban Redevelopment Authority.

On May 18, 1950, demolition began in the Lower Triangle for Pittsburgh's first Renaissance at Gateway Center. The road to demolition was not free of conflict. Instead, every step had to gain approval from voters, the city, and the state. In 1945, the reform-minder Mayor was elected.

In 1945, the Urban Redevelopment Authority was created and given limited powers by the state legislature. In 1947, the power of the redevelopment authority to finance the debt of its public improvement projects through bonds was approved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. And it was not until 1950 that the same court finally dismissed the lawsuits brought by property owners in the Lower Triangle against the redevelopment authority. This decision on January 11th, 1950 permitted the redevelopment authority's use of eminent domain to clear thirty-two acres for the proposed office center and park project (Thomas 1991, 56-60).

The legal process undertaken to endorse the plans of the Urban Redevelopment were well worth it. Alexander Garvin, in The American City: What Works, What Doesn't, summarized the success: "Pittsburgh would not rank third in the nation as a major corporate headquarters if it had not virtually rebuilt its downtown during the 1940s and 1950s" (Garvin 1996, 1).

Lincoln Square and the Lower Triangle were made possible by the collaboration of social interests involved in their planning. In Pittsburgh, investment was guaranteed by the joint cooperation of the Redevelopment Authority and the city's business community, including the Equitable Life Assurance Society (Lawrence 1964, 435). At least four local firms—J & L Steel, PPG Industries, People's Gas, and Westinghouse—and both state and local governments had agreed to lease offices in the complex with little idea of how the buildings would actually take form (Toker 1986, 26).

The Urban Redevelopment Authority eliminated all of the negative externalities (i.e. blight, polluting factories, flooding) in the mostly non-residential "Point" area and replaced them numerous public amenities. Twelve acres of the total thirty-two were comprised of station, warehouse, and trackage belonging to the Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railway Company, a small coal carrier, who had no use for the land and wished to sell it. The other acres contained properties of sixty other owners—a "miscellany of wholesaling, printing shops, a run-down hotel, down-graded stores, and even a few rooming houses" (Lawrence 1964, 429). A fire had also torn through the area in March 1946, just a few months before the city began acquiring lots in July. After the neighborhood was redeveloped, its upfront benefits were seen as in an improved traffic artery for downtown Pittsburgh, increased park space, the preservation of a historical monument, three modern office towers, and $1 million in public earnings from the Redevelopment Authorities "toll charges" of the developer (Lawrence 1964, 434).

In addition to political-economic objectives, social and cultural interests went into the redevelopment of Lincoln Square. Fordham University used the land to expand its campus. Housing Developers built new properties. Damrosch Park provided open park space. And apart from the trickling of its neighborhood effects across the entire Upper West Side, Lincoln Center was lauded by the critic, Harold C. Schonberg, as "the grandest cultural project ever conceived in America—or, very likely, in all history" (New York Times, December 11, 1960). While Schonberg might have been given to hyperbole, the presence of President Eisenhower at the groundbreaking ceremonies was certainly a sign of Center's national importance.

In fulfilling various sets of social interests, Lincoln Square and Gateway Center exemplified the class biases of publicly sponsored large-scale redevelopment. Though Pittsburgh's business community benefited greatly from Gateway Center, the lower-class inhabitants of boarding rooms and the small-business owners located within the Lower Triangle Redevelopment lost their space and private property and were forced to relocate. In addition, Lincoln Center's cultural achievement was representative of urban planning's cultural bias (as something distinct from class). The Center extended the hegemony of affluent groups in determining what elements of a place's cultural identity are expressed and through what type of urban form this is done. In doing so, urban planners, acting as functionary cogs of pre-dominant social interests, decided that the prior existing urban forms of lower income groups were detrimental to the abstraction of cultural identity that these planners wanted to brand on their cities. By reconfiguring the urban physical environment in respect to pre-dominant social interests, the inefficacy of urban planning to provide local benefits at its sites of redevelopment was revealed.

Further Changes in Urban Planning

Liberal planning is unable to be self-critical about its perpetuation of social inequalities because of its formalist approach to urban design and architecture. The planners of Gateway Center and Lincoln Square drew heavily from Le Corbusier's urban modern urbanistic vision because it was consistent with the social interests that determined the direction of urban planning at the time. However, planners did not see how the form of large-scale redevelopment had its own social significance. Though modern superblocks were successful in helping to redirect the middle and upper classes back towards urban cores, their use adversely affected local populations. Yet, even

after vested interests explicated the social costs of modernist urbanism and the institution of urban planning became self-aware of its perpetuation of inequalities, urban planning would continue to marginalize the importance of finding optimal urban forms while fulfilling the public interest.

New York City was a focus for change in urban planning. Robert Moses's slum clearance programs were criticized heavily based on the social costs of displacing households living on condemned land. Displaced residents were forced to relocate as a matter of the City's interest; but, in several cases, governments failed to implement comprehensive displacement plans. The Manhattantown scandals, which helped bring an end to Robert Moses' career, were associated with the ineffective displacement plans of his Slum Clearance Committee. Moreover, even where displacement plans were adequately carried out, communities still suffered because their social networks were destroyed. It is doubtful that these costs could ever be recouped. For example, in New York many displaced residents of the city's slum clearance projects were sent to the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. Robert A.M. Stern observed that by the mid-1960s, the area was the "country's largest ghetto. If it had been an independent city, it would have been among the nation's thirty most populous. [The sprawling neighborhood] also had the country's highest infant mortality rate (39 per 1,000)." Along with the displaced residents, the social costs of large-scale redevelopments elsewhere in the city were dumped on Bedford-Stuyvesant. In response to the negative notoriety the "ghetto" gained from four days of rioting in 1964, the federal government allocated $7 million to neighborhood organizations in pursuit of community rehabilitation (Stern, et al. 1995, 918-919).

The ongoing efforts to revitalize the Bed-Stuy area has demonstrated that though the social costs of redevelopment might have not revealed themselves in the areas immediately surrounding their project sites, they were often dispersed to other parts of the affected cities. The political movement behind the removal of inner-city blight helped conceal the negative costs and externalities of slum clearance projects, but gradually the adverse effects of large-scale redevelopments emerged as an oppositional political movement. The dispersed social costs embroiled social conflict and caused new problems that required more redevelopment dollars to be spent.

However, the form of large-scale redevelopment was not always linked to its social costs. For the most part, the criticisms found within the discipline of architecture and urbanism were co-opted by economic and political forces. Jane Jacobs was representative of the anti-modernist

groups in opposition to slum clearance; however, her polemic was mostly re-interpreted by political interests in the 1960s as a call to end the top-down implementation of urban planning and large-scale redevelopment. Her critique of modernist design would was incorporated by planners, but only after the aesthetic value of vernacular urban and architectural forms was elucidated by post-modern architectural thinkers.

Jacobs's message resounded with concurrent ideological trends in the discipline of political economy. Elite, top-down models for decision-making were gaining unpopularity since World War II. The stigma of centralized planning corresponded with the Cold War and anti-communist campaigns. Furthermore, demands for the democratization of planning paralleled the political protests against the U.S. political system during the Civil Rights Movement. As values such as equality, liberty, and freedom were theorized as objective and universal, elitism began to fall out of favor with the general populace (Field, Higley 1980, 3).

Jacobs and other opponents of modernist city planning constituted a political force in making the institution of urban planning aware of its inequities. Changes in planning policy reflected this awareness, which was imposed on the institution by political interests. For example, New York City's Wagner Administration, in line with the national trend, first adjusted its redevelopment methods by emphasizing rehabilitation—instead of slum clearance—and citizen participation—instead of the top-down Moses method (Garvin 1980).[9] Mayor Lindsay clearly developed this approach alongside the civil rights movement of the 1960s. There was an obvious shift in the policy of the New York City Planning Commission, which "represented a fundamental recognition by City government that those in greatest need have first claim on the City's resources" (New York City Planning Commission 1968).

One of the specific programs of New York City planning was Mayor Lindsay's parks program. Lindsay sought talented designers to carry out a program of small, vest-pocket parks to improve congested, low-income areas of the City. "They can be as small as the area taken up by a single brown stone, and as good as the people in the community are willing to keep them," Parks Commissioner Hoving told the New York Times in 1965 (New York Times, December 2, 1965). Moses himself sent a letter to Hoving contending that the plan was "very expensive and impossible

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9 In this essay Garvin argues that "viewing New York City housing strategies against a time line showing key national legislation and significant local projects illustrates the strong influence of New York's housing policies on every city in the United States" (Ibid, 73).

to administer….These tiny parks," he said, "will not bring light and air to the neighborhoods where they are built and will in the end prove to be neighborhood nuisances" (New York Times, May 11, 1966).

Moses was right: many of these parks reached a state of disrepair after only a few years of use (Garvin 1996, 38). Thus, in the end, the Linsday Administration's formalist interpretation of urban form negated the social importance of urban form. Moses recognized the problem with the scale of the parks; the urban forms of the vest-pocket parks were not large enough to maintain a positive social impact. Lindsay's planners had a rudimentary, formalist understanding of urban form. They only thought about the urban forms of the parks in terms of their aesthetic features, which they assumed would be powerful enough to attract park users. Understanding the full social impact of urban form would require an examination of the size of the urban form and the quantity of local public goods provided. The vest-pocket planners did not engage this examination because the parks program fulfilled political interests in spreading the benefits of urban planning to all income groups. This political interest was more than irrespective of the optimal physical form of development. The Lindsay Administration attempted to justify the parks' design features as sources of symbolic capital; this justification was predicated on the upper class's command over urbanization's formal representation of cultural understanding. Moreover, these indictments of New York's vest-pocket parks program could be applied to the general thrust of all planning policy in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Transformations in economic institutions and ideology were also affecting the changes in urban policy. In 1973, President Nixon declared the urban crisis over and ushered a groundswell of change against the urban planning practices formulated within an economic order supported by Keynesian thought. Moreover, Nixon's declaration was the signal of a new era of economic ideas and institutional structure that would force city planners to forego active and managerial roles they had fulfilled through the 1940s to 1960s under urban redevelopment programs. The failures of Keynesian economic policy to address the inflationary results of large-scale public investment were explicated by the 1970s condition of stagflation. Federal policy-makers abandoned public investment for deflationary tools and instead relied on tax cuts to stimulate investment and generate government revenue. Mark Blythe would explain this transformation as the counter movement away from the embedded liberalism of big government:

> In contrast to the previous double movement, organized business groups and their political allies displaced states as the principal actors responding to economic dislocation. Such business groups used a variety of monetarist and other "neoclassical" ideas to redefine the boundaries of political economy away from the Keynesian emphasis on redistribution and growth and toward the neoliberal emphasis on inflation control and monetary stability. (Blythe 2002, 5-6)

The termination of the federal urban renewal programs in 1973 signified that publicly funded large-scale redevelopment—the type of urban planning which Jane Jacobs critiqued—was no longer compatible with the federal government's economic ideas and policies.

Moreover, suburban sprawl also continued to disperse populations and capital investments away from central cities—compounding the budget deficiencies of U.S. cities due to economic restructuring and the reduction of federal aid to planning programs. The collapse of New York City's finances in 1975 bankrupted the city and was followed by fiscal crises in several other U.S. cities (Fainstein 2001, 18). With little to no funds at their disposal, cities were forced to conjure up new methods to stimulate economic development and public investment. Economic development corporations emerged as quasi-public tools to circumvent restrictions on development. As antecedents to the urban redevelopment authorities pioneered before the 1949 Housing Act, the typical development corporation could float bonds exempt from federal income taxes, act as developer, and create its own construction standards without reference to local building codes or zoning laws (Garvin 1980, 80). In 1987, New York's Public Development Corporation was involved in spurring the construction of 200 projects, worth a total of $13 billion (Fainstein 2001, 112). In the 1970s, cities also saw their state governments impose tax abatement programs on their whimpering budgets. Two programs in New York, the 421-a of 1971 and the J-51 of 1975, awarded abatements from real estate taxes for new developments and for the rehabilitation and conversion of the existing housing stock (New York Times, February 18, 1988; Garvin 1980, 82). These programs emerged in the planning practice as entrepreneurial mechanisms that could further the economic goals of liberal planning despite the drastic cuts in federal urban renewal programs.

The methods of entrepreneurial city planning have continued to change as the economic transformations of the early 1970s facilitated the rise of the "global city"—defined by Saskia Sassen as the "re-scaling of what are the strategic territories" of the city in the current stage of material history. "One of the key properties of the current phase is the ascendance of information

technologies and the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capital….It is in this context that we see a re-scaling of what are the strategic territories that articulate the new system. With the partial unbundling or at least weakening of the nation as a spatial unit due to privatization and deregulation and the associated strengthening of globalization come conditions for the ascendance of other spatial units of scale" (Sassen 2005, 27).

The rescaling of the city's strategic territory has implied changes in the role of entrepreneurial city planning. Social interests have relied less on urban planning as a redistributive measure for stimulating urban development. Instead, urban planning has functioned as a marketing mechanism for cities to maintain competition at a trans-national level. Branding cities as sites for business has become a new social objective for urban planning, and the value of urban form has been re-engaged by urban planners. In the process of image making, planners have used distinctive architectural and urban forms to increase the aesthetic draw of their cities as centers for cultural sophistication and social progress. In so doing, planners have acknowledged the social desire for accumulating "symbolic capital" as a motivating factor in social behavior.

However, urban planning's re-engagement of urban form has not been anymore critical of its role in perpetuating social inequalities. Through design zoning, cities have given incentives to commercial developers to design according to an aesthetically oriented vision of what the city should look like from a skyline and street level. Accompanying design zoning's preferred building type, bulk bonuses in exchange for privately-owned public space have allowed developers to build higher and bigger buildings (where zoning would normally prevent it) while preserving the planning department's agenda to encourage street level vitality. The new trends in urban planning's concern for urban forms have forced critics to conclude that "while attention to the quality and texture of the city's architecture and spaces—both new and historic—is of vital importance, the role of design as the expression of privilege has never been clearer" (Sorkin 2006, 9).

Conclusion

This chapter has documented the social position of urban planning. Though all sorts of social interests direct the planning process, political and economic factors have had held the most sway over the formulation of planning policy. That said, political-economic transformations have mostly determined the shifts in policy through the twentieth century. Moreover, because urban planning

has been reliant on social interests in its function, its formal concern over the urban physical environment has been in fulfillment of social interests. Economic interests have used aesthetically pleasing forms to stimulate economic development. In addition, culturally based interests have sought the representation of cultural understanding through form as symbolic capital. As such, urban planning has not fully examined the full social impact of form because it is not concerned with finding the socially optimal forms of development. Its concern is confined to finding the most appropriate forms for the expression of social interests, which have routinely been politically and economically oriented. While the embrace of Pareto optimality and economic efficiency is in the public's best interest, it has rarely become a factor in urban planning's fulfillment of social interests. (The next chapter will explore some of the historic cases in which it has.)

Urban planning's terse handling of urban form has stemmed from its inability to recognize that physical form, not public policy, is the sustaining factor in the planning dialectic between development and inequality. The next chapter further explores this debate and offers a solution for its amelioration. To this end, what is needed is a realignment of urban planning's social objectives and the adoption of architectural theory for its social activism and not merely its formalist aesthetic principles. Furthermore, Chapter 2 covers the concepts of urban economics and public goods theory that together can help alleviate the disproportionate benefits of economic development to affluent groups. The theory on household sorting in relation to the provision of public goods shows how the process of development can prevent lower income groups from enjoying the benefits of developmental outcomes. It follows that maintaining attention to household preferences for local public goods will allow planners to provide local public goods in forms appropriate to the level of their local demand. Because all income groups demand a different quantity of public goods, the provision of local public goods should vary according to the changes in demographics across space and the geographical clustering of income groups.

CHAPTER 2: A NEW BASIS FOR PLANNING

Orthodox planning theory does not so much dispute the form of the physical city as promote opportunities for the fulfillment of social interests. Planners have rarely connected the effectiveness of their policies to an analysis of the built forms embodying their social objectives. In the few cases where this connection has been made, the built form stands as evidence of the policy's efficiency in satisfying social interests but never as an indication that the planning policy behind the form's development simultaneously perpetuated the social inequalities inherent in the built environment. This chapter intends to make this link by creating an interdisciplinary framework for evaluating planning policy. A new basis for urban planning can then be established.

Planning has mainly concerned itself with only one aspect of urban behavior: the political-economic decisions that determine its direction. Accordingly, to the liberal planner the city's built form is merely a side effect of development and not something that independently has the power to effect the decisions and behaviors of urban actors.

In contrast, the three approaches presented in this chapter take urban form as a powerful tool for shaping urban life and challenging social inequality. The three approaches emanate from the disciplines of architecture, urban economics, and Marxist critical urban theory. Each of these approaches to urban form has broadly defined its own social agenda for planning as a starting point for investigating urban environments. For instance, the urban economist is concerned about the marginal social costs and benefits of urban action and argues that planners should make decisions with these factors in mind.

The structuralist approach, which is derivative of Marxist critical urban theory, is more polemical in its position on urban planning. Structuralists argue that the process of urbanization is characterized by changes in the capital accumulation process due to political-economic transformations. When these changes occur, not only are the physical forms and spaces of the city altered, so are the spatial practices of individuals living within these landscapes. Harvey and other structuralists hold that "Spatial practices derive their efficacy in social life only through the structure of social relations within which they come into play. Under the social relations of capitalism, spatial practices become imbued with class meanings." However, special practices are not derivative of capitalism. Rather "spatial practices take on specific meanings and these meanings are put into

motion and spaces are used in a particular way through the agency of class, gender, or other social practices" (Harvey 1990, 259).

The city planner's role in the urbanization process, according to a structuralist, stems from how different classes "construct their sense of territory and community in radically different ways" (Ibid, 260). Whereas the lower class constructs its sense of community through the appropriation of urban space and sustains its livelihood through community-provided capital, the upper class has enough capital to forego a reliance on community for survival and can instead build community to protect and enhance the value of private property. The state is seen as one form of community that is generally beneficial; but, more specifically, the institution of urban planning functions as an ameliorative mechanism for reducing negative externalities and as a protective mechanism for maintaining the "tone" of community space (Ibid, 261).

Structuralist theorists have interpreted the goals of planners as being motivated by an interest in maintaining the upper class's hegemonic position in intra-urban class competition. It follows that these motivations have caused planners to support the upper class's preference for urban forms as resources for economic development and "symbolic capital," a term used by Bourdieau to describe the use of materials by affluent groups as reifying elements in their social and cultural understanding. This has implied that in cases where spatial conflict exists between classes, such as in the gentrification process, urban form has become the material means by which the upper class has asserted its domination over urban space.

Amidst political-economic transformations in the process of capital accumulation, structuralists have observed that the mechanisms and scope of urban planning have changed while the original function of the urban planner has remained intact. Between the Great Depression and the institutionalizing of neo-conservatism in the early 1970s, the U.S. government took more of an active role in the national economy and also the lives of the unemployed and the poor. Despite the disproportionate benefits of slum clearance programs to the middle class, lower-income groups benefited from social service-type urban planning programs during this period.

However, since 1972, the class of urban poor has only been left only to increase as "[f]iscal constraints...have undercut the flow of public services, and hence the life-support mechanisms, for the mass of the unemployed and the poor" (Harvey 1990, 262). These fiscal constraints have accompanied the movement in the planning practice towards liberal, entrepreneurial-style planning

focused on economic development and the type of public-private partnerships that made urban redevelopment for the upper classes possible. Likewise, "the use of increasingly scarce resources to capture development has meant that the social consumption of the poor was neglected in order to provide benefits to keep the rich and powerful in town. This was the switch in direction that President Nixon signaled when he declared the urban crisis over in 1973" (Ibid, 266).

This chapter seeks to synthesize the structuralist criticism of planning with the social activism of architecture and analytical methods of urban economics. This will allow us to analyze the city in a manner that accords with urban planning's concern for the public interest but also with the architectural historian's understanding of the social impact of built forms. To frame this mission, the architectural transition from modernist, to anti-modernist, to post-modernist urbanism will be investigated with respect to the subsequent changes in past planning strategies that were designed to protect the physical public realm.

Architecture and Urbanism

When U.S. planners utilized Le Corbusier's architecture and urbanism, they did so for its incorporation of density and open space. The integration of open space into large-scale redevelopments, it was hoped, would reverse suburbanization by appealing to suburbanites, whose quest for more open space was otherwise leading them to the suburbs. The issue was aiding economic development through modernist architecture, not how the social impact of Le Corbusier's functional urbanism was designed around a radical new vision for urban life. The power of these forms to drastically alter patterns of social behavior was secondary to the rudimentary liberal planning goals of blight removal and central city redevelopment.

Le Corbusier's architecture and urbanism was entirely cognizant of the power of urban form. He attacked the nineteenth-century city's traditional street corridor and housing block form, which he associated with the Garden City movement and the urban problems of the industrial city. In 1928, he developed the Redressement Français plan for Paris in which he claimed that the city's urban worker housing problem could be solved, while the density of Paris quadrupled, and 90 percent of the land left free for vegetation. He also argued for a law creating a new authority with the power to utilize eminent domain in acquiring land for redevelopment at market value (Mumford 2000, 14-15). Le Corbusier's urban design proposal could be implemented by undoing central Paris's prior

development and implementing the "functionalist" city of divided uses and high-rise offices towers surrounded by housing blocks or "compact vertical masses" sited in a "sea of greenery" (Mumford 2000, 20).

In contrast to liberal planners, Le Corbusier was not as occupied with utilizing architecture to stimulate economic development as he was with finding the appropriate urban and architectural forms for the capitalist system of social production. In the Foreword to his The City of Tomorrow, he explicated the design problem he encountered: "The DWELLING again puts before us the architectural problem in the demand for totally new methods of building, the problem of new plans adopted to modern life, the problem of an aesthetic in harmony with the new spirit" (Le Corbusier 1971, xxii).

The poor urban conditions of Paris and its associated small-scale units of social organization indicated that neither urban forms nor methods of planning had yet to catch up with the machine-age of science and industry. His vision of the city was predicated on the goal of bringing architecture and urbanism in line with the organizational demands of large-scale industrial capitalism in a manner consistent with Frederick Winslow Taylor's system of scientific management and Henry Ford's systems of mass production (Mumford 2000, 20-21).

Le Corbusier further distanced himself from planners when he specified how his vision could be realized. First, he situated his philosophy for urbanism "above politics" as form and design were the answers to urban social problems—not political action. Moreover, architecture and urbanism were to be given more weight than politics in the ranking of social interests: "Architecture or revolution," he declared. "Revolution can be avoided" (19-20). Le Corbusier also transgressed the typical geographic scope of the social interests usually determinant of planning objectives. He overstepped municipal, regional, state, and national boundaries by planning for the creation of an elite international governing body that could accumulate the power and capital needed to implement his urban proposal across the world.[10] However, the international social engagement of his design proposals was (as events would tell) too irrespective of the spatial idiosyncrasies of social interests to be fully implemented throughout any city.

In the early years of federal urban renewal, it did seem like his superblock was more

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10 Both his associations with CIAM (the International Congress for Modern Architecture) and his rebuilding plan for Paris, which would was planned to be financed with international pools of capital, reflected his support of international monopolies over the direction of architecture and the financing of urban redevelopment.

appropriate to large-scale industrial capitalism than were traditional tenement blocks. However, as it turned out, it was only effective at meeting urban renewal's liberal agenda of blight removal and economic development. Moreover, in built form, his urban philosophy was not as apolitical as he had hoped. In fact, the political rejection of large-scale federal urban renewal programs in 1973 was an indication of the highly political nature of his aversion to the small-scale units of social organization—those that typically encompassed community interests and local urban forms.

The large-scale urban reconfigurations needed to accommodate superblock redevelopments caused immediate social disruption. The repercussions reverberated over the displacement effects, the incongruence of Modernist forms with traditional neighborhood forms, the disproportionate distribution of urban renewal benefits to the white middle class, and the long-term phasing of large-scale redevelopment. From the federal government's perspective, these issues encapsulated the "inefficiencies" of Title 1 programs and their associated troublesome methods of socialized investment.[11]

The Urbanist Polemic Against Modernism

Opposition to large-scale slum clearance and redevelopment also came from within the architecture and urbanism discipline. The aesthetic critique against Le Corbusier and CIAM's functionalist urbanism polemicized the urbanistic philosophy's faith in the large-scale reorganization of urban social life at the expense of local residents and urban traditions.

Jane Jacobs was a vocal critic of Le Corbusier and the functionalist movement. In her book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jacobs criticized the vision of Le Corbusier's "dream city:"

> This vision and its bold symbolism have been all but irresistible to planners, houses, designers, and to developers, lenders and mayors too. It exerts a great pull on 'progressive' zoners, who write rules calculated to encourage nonproject builders to reflect, if only a little, the dream. No matter how vulgarize or clumsy the design, how dreary and useless the open space, how dull the close-up view,

11 For the federal government on the race bias of federal renewal programs, see: *New York Times*. 1954. U.S. housing chief wars on race bias. October 30, 1954. On general funding issues concerning construction delays and the New York Approach whereby private developers were charged with implantations of the program for displacement, see: Grutzner, Charles. U.S. assails City in housing delay; showdown Near. *New York Times*, May 24, 1956. For political attacks against urban renewal, see the Los Angeles experience with redevelopment. For his role in the Chavez Ravine redevelopment project, Frank Wilkinson, the assistant director of the Los Angeles City Housing Authority, stood trial before the Congressional Committee for Unamerican Activities, fired from his job, and sentenced to one in prison. The redevelopment project failed after a Mayoral election, in which stopping "un-American" spending was a platform in the winning campaign (pbs.org, Story of the Chavez Ravine).

an imitation of Le Corbusier shouts 'Look what I made!'…But as to how the city works, it tells, like the Garden City, nothing but lies. (Jacobs 1961, 23).

Jacobs also attacked the liberal, or "progressive," basis for planning. Until her death in 2006, Jacobs would continue to question the public use of eminent domain for economic development when such development projects disproportionately victimized poor minorities (Jacobs 2004, 11). Jacobs was searching for what she saw as the appropriate methods of social organization given a set of parameters that were more diverse than economic and political considerations.

Jacobs devoted particular attention to the urban form of city streets and their sidewalks, which she claimed were "the main public places of a city" (Ibid, 29). For the safety of cities she claimed that the traditional street and sidewalk must be maintained. "[T]here must be a clear demarcation between what is public space and what is private space. Public and private spaces cannot ooze into each other as they typically do in suburban settings or in projects" (Ibid, 35). The street corridor formed by buildings facing the street must also accompany a balance between spaces for "privacy" and spaces for public "contact" (Ibid, 35-73).

Though Jacobs's mission was to critique the basis of orthodox city planning, she did not hold that city planning could be improved by reconstituting the planner's approach to urban form. Rather, Jacobs favored an "organic" approach to city planning and development. In criticizing the orthodox methods of "unurban" modernist liberal planning, she pointed towards its misconception of the economic and social structures she saw operating in the city:

> "There is nothing economically or socially inevitable about either the decay of old cities or the fresh-minded decadence of the new unurban urbanization. On the contrary, no other aspect of our economy and society has been more purposefully manipulated for a full quarter of a century to achieve precisely what we are getting" (Jacobs 1961, 7).

Moreover, after a hermeneutic-like study of the city's "most ordinary scenes and events," Jacobs argued for the "need of cities for a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant mutual support, both economically and socially" (Ibid, 13-14).

Neither Jacobs nor Le Corbusier held that urban planning should be enslaved to political and economic factors; rather their basis for action was the acknowledgement that the formal organization and composition of urban elements had a meaningful impact on the material and social practices of individuals. It followed that urban social problems (e.g. housing shortages, slums,

and the victimization of the lower classes) stemmed partly from the structures of cities and the flawed approaches to their reorganization. The same problems could partially be alleviated through changes in the approaches of planners and designers to the formal units of urban organization.

Far from advocating Le Corbusier's vision to completely reorganize the city, Jacobs noted the problems with relying on form to challenge social problems: "I do not meant to imply that a city's planning and design, or its types of streets and street life, can automatically overcome segregation and discrimination. Too many other kinds of effort are also required to right these injustices" (72).[12]

Urban Planning's Response

The Jacobs' urbanist approach, when put into practice across American cities, was filtered through liberal theory as the political need to dismantle the top-down, large-scale planning style of Le Corbusian urbanism. Despite alterations to the methods of implementation, the forms of functionalist urbanism were largely left untouched by planners who still preferred functionalist and modernist forms for urban redevelopment. For instance, though New York City abandoned its slum clearance programs in 1961, it continued to build public housing projects utilizing Le Corbusier's "tower-in-a-park" form (such as in 1967 with the Atlantic Terminal Houses that will be discussed in the following chapter). In addition, the New York City planning department in 1961 revised the 1916 zoning resolution to insure "a general feeling of openness at street level," a goal that was consistent with Mies van der Rohe's modernist design for a "tower-in-a-plaza" but in no way derivative of Jacobs' faith in the traditional street corridor (Kayden 2000, 10).

It was not until 1967 that the political rhetoric of urban renewal through rehabilitation and community participation would finally coincide with the formal principles of the anti-modernist movement. In New York, Mayor Lindsay and the City Planning Commission chartered the Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design, which morphed into the Urban Design Group under the Department of Planning. It its initial study, it reported that:

> The largest single design sin of New York's subsidized and urban renewal housing is that, although immense in scale, covering block after block, it does not produce neighborhoods. It

12 Similarly, the thesis does not argue that form can solve social problems. Rather it calls for urban planning to be more self-critical by advocating the analysis of urban form in terms of its physical supply of local public goods. This is beyond the simple aesthetic analysis of form that urban planners typically conduct when evaluating the externalities of development.

> instead abstracts them. The buildings begin bland in design, but end brutal in effect. (Mayor's Task Force on the Design of New York 1967)

The allusion to The Death and Life of Great American Cities was quite explicit. The concept of abstraction was also utilized by Jacobs to describe a city sidewalk, which "by itself is nothing. It is an abstraction" (Jacobs 1961, 30). Both Jacobs and the Group held that it was the users of urban space that brought urban forms to life. Large-scale modernist projects, on the other hand, relied too much on the abstract idea of rebuilding cities and the imposition of new urban realities.

Moreover, public housing projects like East Midtown Plaza and amendments to the 1961 zoning resolution indicated that urbanist-minded design had at least been partially integrated into the political interests of urban planning. Jacobs' faith in the traditional, pedestrian-oriented city block, and its organization of the "most ordinary scenes" of healthy urban life, lent form to the mixed-land use and street level commercial space of East Midtown Plaza (Garvin 1980, 80). In addition, her study of the geographical clustering of urban activity in localization and urbanization economies led to zoning amendments that introduced five special purpose zoning districts for the city (the Special Theatre District in 1967, the Special Lincoln Square District in 1969, the Special Greenwich Street Development District in 1971, and the Special Manhattan Landing District in 1971). Each district received special zoning treatment in accordance with the special land use and activity that lent formal identity and community character to each district (Kayden 2000, 13).

While these actions suggested that planners were beginning to grasp the potentially adverse power of redeveloping cities with new urban forms, fiscal pressures would redirect the planner's concern for urban design towards the provision of open space at street-level. Without thinking about Jacobs' prescriptions, matters of economic efficiency, or the conflicts between the spatial practices of the rich and poor, planners assumed that any increases in the supply of open space would be good for both cities and development. Historically, this had worked as planners successfully molded their plans for urban development to the preferences of households for open space and attractive cities. Large public parks, such as Central Park, functioned as tools for real estate development, while Moses and other Title 1 administrators utilized the open space of Le Corbusier's "tower-in-a-park" to attract middle class households back to city centers.

Urban Economics and Optimal Forms

More so than the urban planner, the urban economist is more aware of the social impact of urban forms. As such, the urban economist measures the impact of forms with more than just an eye towards economic development. In terms of urban planning, the goal is to find the optimal outcomes from the urban development process based on the social costs and benefits of the reallocation of capital and goods. Specifically, this concerns, as Jacobs and Le Corbusier both queried, a balance between public and private space and open and built space. Within these parameters, local preferences for public goods, such as public and open space, are paramount to how the urban economist evaluates urban forms. Because thinking of urban forms in terms of efficiency is essential to obtaining socially optimal outcomes from urban development, a small urban economics lesson is in store.

Finding the optimal arrangement of urban forms involves the goal of Pareto optimality, wherein the goal is to make one individual better off through the rearrangement of forms without making any other individual worse off. When aggregated into neighborhoods, the goal would be to improve the neighborhood without victimizing any of its residents. Of course, we will never reach a point wherein the reallocation of urban resources will cease to make at least one person better off, thus the goal of Pareto optimality could forever be functioning as a theoretical guide for urban action.

In urban economics, the planner's problem is one of finding the optimal allocation of land. Because it does not make sense for all goods to be privately or publicly provided, the optimal allocation of land concerns the optimal division between its public and private usages. When it makes more sense for any resource to be publicly provided, that resource is referred to as a public good. City parks and open spaces are public goods because, by definition, they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. A good is nonrivalrous when one individual's consumption of that good does not adversely effect another individual and his or her ability to consume that same good. A good is nonexcludable when the costs of preventing individuals from consuming that good (usually through price) are too high to justify any preventive measures that might be taken. Parks are nonrivalrous because, in most cases, except when a park becomes extremely crowded, one citizen's enjoyment of park space does not interfere with the enjoyment of other park users. And parks are nonexcludable because charging people for the benefits they receive from park usage

is more trouble than it is worth. Milton Friedman, in Capitalism and Freedom, was keen to the impracticalities behind excluding people from city parks based upon who would not pay admission:

> For the city park, it is extremely difficult to identify the people who benefit from it and to charge them for the benefits which they receive. If there is a park in the middle of the city, the houses on all sides get the benefit of the open space, and people who walk through it or by it also benefit. To maintain toll collectors at the gates or to impose annual charges per window overlooking the park would be very expensive." (Friedman 1962, 31).

Similarly, city streets and highways are public goods because it would also be impractical to set up tollbooths on every block to charge people for their use of the road, although technology is now making it easier for cities to do so. Instead of tollbooths, governments use taxes to pay for the provision of public goods. Gasoline taxes are used to pay for roads; and property, sales, and income taxes are used to pay for local public goods, like parks and other elements of the physical public realm.

Though parks (and open spaces) are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, because of the transportation costs of traveling across space their benefits are mostly limited to the people inhabiting their surrounding geographical area. One individual living far away from a park cannot enjoy that park as much as another who lives in close proximity for a number of reasons. One, the transportation costs involved in traveling to the park decrease the amount of benefits gained from using the park. Two, the enjoyment of park views by neighboring residents would not be shared by non-neighbors. Three, the further one lives from a park, the less of a chance one will ever benefit just from passing by the park without stopping to use it.

With this said, we can explain household sorting, why wealthier households cluster around parks, and how parks and open space can be utilized for economic development. The benefits of well-maintained parks generate positive externalities that increase the value of the park's surrounding property (Weicher, Zerbst 1973). Higher-income households are more willing to pay for more park acreage because the marginal benefits they receive from one more acre of park space are very high. This means that higher-incomes, to the unfortunate disadvantage of lower-incomes, both drive up the costs and are more willing to pay the higher costs of living close to a park. This makes it harder for lower-income households to locate near well-maintained and desirable parks. It is because of these phenomena, that liberal planners can satisfy their objectives by factoring households preferences for local public goods to formulate plans for economic development and

achieve ideal household sorting patterns.

Under this model for public goods, the forms that cities grow in and out of are of critical importance to the urban economist. Though planning policy has also concerned itself with the impact of development on the attractiveness of cities, the limit of its aesthetic concern is bound by the economic and political costs attached to the aesthetic development of cities. The power of urban form, however, can extend beyond the economic and political behavior of individuals just as Le Corbusier and Jacobs have argued.

By evaluating urban development in terms of public goods and Pareto efficiency, the larger social implications of urban form can be realized. The theory on household sorting in relation to the provision of public goods shows how improvements to the physical public realm can prevent lower income groups from enjoying the benefits. It follows that maintaining attention to household preferences for local public goods will allow planners to provide local public goods in forms appropriate to their local demand. Because all income groups demand a different quantity of public goods, the provision of local public goods should vary according to the changes in demographics across space and the geographical clustering of income groups.

In an ideal world, planners would never provide open space without respect to the actual demand for local open space. The reason being is that increases in the supply of public goods are critical to the dialectic between development and inequality. Because of the economic and aesthetic interests held by key stakeholders in the urban process, planners have endorsed large-scale developments in order to revitalize cities with modern architecture. The urban forms of these projects have increased the supply of local public goods through formal variations on the theme of “privately owned public space.” While the provision of public goods in neighborhoods affected by this policy once accorded to local household preferences, the new developments deliberately increased the quantities of public goods to attract higher income households more willing to pay for the increased supply. This process has characterized urban revitalization but also gentrification, wherein the social costs of development are absorbed by low-incomes households who are forced out of the revitalized neighborhood.

As such, the urban economist’s concern with urban form accounts for the marginal social costs and benefits of development. Moreover, the need for planning arises when the marginal social costs and negative externalities of forms produced by private development outweigh the marginal

social benefits. State intervention in the development process is then used to regulate the privately sponsored formal arrangement of cities in hopes that the publicly sponsored formal reconfiguration will increase the marginal social benefits of development and provide a more optimal division between the public and private usage of land.

Despite this framework, planners have essentially relied on the positive externalities of open space to justify their support of large-scale modernist redevelopment and "privately-owned public space." In doing so, they have implied that the positive externalities of open space at street-level outweigh the negative externalities of taller, bigger buildings, which encroach on the light and air of surrounding property and city streets.

In their calculations, planners have neglected any consideration of what would be the most efficient form of the new development. The taller building fulfills the economic interest to provide more rentable space, but the abandonment of the traditional street corridor has produced its own negative costs. For example, the feelings of safety and comfort in density that buildings facing and abutting the street lend to sidewalk users has been negated by the insertion of a plaza (or any form of open space) between the building and the sidewalk.

Each of the favored development forms of New York's planning department have been affirmed by policy before measurements of the social costs of such forms have been taken. Instead, it has been assumed a priori that the provision of open space would contain widespread public benefits. However, in later evaluations of their policies the City has found that the social costs of allowing developers to abandon the street corridor in order to build higher were never recouped. A large quantity of the new, "bonusable" open space was underutilized.

Therefore, whereas the urban economist thinks of all the possible marginal costs and benefits (i.e. the tradeoffs) of the reallocation of urban resources, the urban planning policy of "privately-owned public space" accounts for only two factors: the aesthetics of the street corridor and the amount of rentable space. Even though architectural and urbanism thinkers have, at times, influenced urban design policy through their imbuement of urban form with a sense of social agency, planners have negated these issues in the calculation of urban form's costs and benefits.

Urban Design Policy

The regulation of urban design through land use regulations illustrates how uniting the architectural and urban economics concerns for form can lead to more optimal outcomes in the urban development process.

Before zoning became institutionalized by states, private neighborhood covenants regulated the use of land within defined neighborhoods to protect the devaluing of private property because of nearby nuisances and unsightly forms of development. These private covenants existed, for instance, in Brooklyn in the 19th century, but variations still regulate the use of land in Houston, Texas and in New Urbanist-style, planned communities, such as Seaside, Florida.

In 1929, three years after the U.S. Supreme Court validated public land use controls in Euclid v. Amber Reality Company, the Ohio Supreme Court in Dixon v. Van Sweringen Company legitimized private covenants and land use regulations. These private covenants set the stage for the eventual adoption of public land use controls throughout the country because covenant schemes helped bring further legitimacy to the "'idea that private owners should surrender some of their individual property rights for the common good, including their own'" (Korngold 2001, 641).

In upholding the private covenants that the Van Sweringen Company had established for a 4,000-acre tract of land it was developing, the Dixon court recognized the benefits of covenants as similar in their legal architecture with private contracts. The court also supported the private covenants on the liberal basis that they would foster economic development: "We see no reason for denying the right of these parties to contract between themselves, the result of such contracts up to date being…to create a highly exclusive and valuable residential district" (625). Moreover, the Dixon court's decision was made on grounds of economic efficiency in that it recognized the ability of private covenants to help achieve the efficient allocation of land resources in that "by using real covenants, one can acquire a nonpossessory interest in the land of another but without having to buy more than she wants" (Ibid).

While the goal to encourage development of the kind supported by the Dixon court has provided a simple reason for supporting private and later public land use restrictions, urban economics has been needed to explain the advantages that zoning has over private land use devices and why publicly enforced zoning code has survived where private restrictions have expired. Simply put, zoning has been a more efficient means of land use regulation. For instance,

the scope of zoning has included the social costs and benefits of its implementation across entire cities. Whereas the geographical area of private covenants is quite small, "zoning can provide a comprehensive solution for all of the land held by different owners within the governmental units" (Ibid, 641). Thus, private covenants might be more efficient at restricting the use of land in a particular neighborhood, but the transaction costs of multiple private bodies negotiating land use restrictions across a city would be too high enough to warrant zoning regulations enforced by city-wide, public governments.

New York City's 1916 Zoning Resolution

Both private covenants and zoning laws have presented effective urban policies because they have effectively synthesized planning objectives, the architect's social activation of form, and the urban economist's concern for economic efficiency. When New York City passed its 1916 Zoning Resolution, this approach to urban planning coalesced in the creation a lasting piece of urban legislation, but one that also encoded class conflict into the regulation of the city's urban physical environment.

The need for the 1916 Resolution arose from New York City's Commissioner's Plan of 1811. In 1807 Simeon deWitt, Gouvenerneur Morris, and John Rutherford were commissioned by the commissioner of Manhattan to design the model that would regulate the "final and conclusive" occupancy of the island. Their plan, known as the Commissioner's Plan of 1811, consisted of 12 avenues running north-south and 155 streets running east-west, which divided the undeveloped section of the island into 2,028 blocks of two hundred by six hundred feet or eight hundred feet (Koolhaas 1997, 18).

According to Rem Koolhaas, the Commissioner's Plan was "the most courageous act of prediction in Western civilization: the land it divides, unoccupied; the population it describes, conjectural; the buildings it locates, phantoms; the activities it frames, nonexistent" (Ibid: 18). The simple, two-dimensional grid was irrespective of both the growth that would occur vertically and the various activities the land could eventually accommodate. Nevertheless, the plan delineated a simple division between public and private spaces: streets, sidewalks, and one large park were public; blocks were private.

In the mid-nineteenth century, civic groups began to realize the problems with the

accommodation of the future development by the Commissioner's Plan's: neither private nor public space was protected from devaluation because of the encroachment of private development, nuisance activities, and unsightly forms of development. The upward growth of the city in the early 20th century hashed conflicts between the divisions of private and public space as population densities in Manhattan exploded with immigration and new building technologies. The tall and bulky buildings erected in downtown Manhattan between 1898 and 1915, such as the Woolworth Building and the Equitable Life Assurance Building, infringed upon spaces of both the private and public realms by shutting off passages for light and air (Kayden 2000, 7).

Meanwhile, the overlap of manufacturing and commercial uses of land was also troubling citizens uptown. The Fifth Avenue Merchant's Association was repulsed by the presence of immigrant garment workers lingering around their retail spaces during breaks. While garment manufacturers wanted to minimize transaction costs by locating close to their Fifth Avenue retail outlets, the merchants found the effects of this proximity deleterious to business.[13] In 1913, at the request of the Fifth Avenue Merchant's Association, the Manhattan borough president, George McAneny, proposed to the City's Board of Estimate and Apportionment that "an effort should be made to regulate the height, size, and arrangement of buildings" (Toll 1969, 147).

Therefore, interests in land use regulations emerged in two different areas of the city and sought restrictions on both the forms of development and the use of land. The intersection of these interests led the Board of Estimate and Apportionment to establish, on February 27, 1913, a Committee on City Planning to review their demands. Between 1913 and 1916, two zoning commissions pursued land-use controls that would embody the concerns of the Fifth Avenue Association. In 1914, the State of New York endowed the City of New York with the legal power to zone. And finally, on July 25, 1916, the Board approved a zoning resolution that subjected all land in the city to a regulatory framework for development and use (Kayden 2000, 8).

As a piece of zoning legislation, the 1916 resolution efficiently regulated the use of land but also provided height and bulk restrictions that would produce ideal forms that were respective of place. It defined three types of zoning districts dealing with use, height, and area; delineated individual "classes" within each of these three districts; and organized the districts on a city map. Directly addressing the gargantuan skyscrapers that had recently been built, maximum building

13 This account taken from Toll 1969 (112-116), Willis 1993 (10-11), and Makielski 1966 (11).

heights would depend on the building's area, the width of the street a building fronted, and the amount of setback from the building to the street. The restrictions also made an exception: towers covering only twenty-five percent of their lots could rise to the moon if desired. However, because most developers did not have the capital to assemble a large lot and could only build on twenty-five percent of the property, most buildings rising between 1916 and 1961 took on the "wedding cake" typology illustrated by Hugh Ferriss's 1922 in his Study for Maximum Mass Permitted by the 1916 New York Zoning Law (8-9).

The 1916 Zoning Resolution remained intact until the 1961 amendments. By the 1950s, the skyscraper "wedding cake" form was outdated in the context of modern architecture. In 1956, James Felt, the chairman of the City Planning Commission, announced the need for a rezoning study and commissioned the Voorhees firm to release its study, Zoning New York City. The Voorhees report itself claimed that the 1916 Zoning Resolution…

> was written in large measure to cope with the problem of keeping buildings from robbing other buildings or the public streets of adequate light. In attempting to solve this problem, a fixed geometric setback plane was established above a specified height, which has the now familiar limitation of producing rigid and complex building shapes which are not only uneconomic to construct but inefficient to use…[The] proposed regulations are intended to insure that public streets and all portions of buildings fronting on streets have access to light and air, and to promote a general feeling of openness at street level. A series of flexible and interchangeable regulations has been developed with the goal of permitting the maximum possible degree of design freedom in achieving economic, efficient, and attractive buildings. (9-10)

In 1961, the Voorhees report became effective as a new zoning code with few modifications from its original draft. On many counts, the 1961 resolution was reflective of planning objectives to stimulate development and reconfigure the city with a certain modern aesthetic vision. When Felt announced the need for a rezoning study, he said the 1916 resolution "fails to provide us with an adequate guide either for strengthening our economy or improving our living conditions" (New York Times, September 9, 1956). Moreover, the rezoning plan was clear in its intent to update the zoning mechanism for protecting open space at street-level with respect to modernist architecture and urbanism. Mies's 1958 Seagram Building and Skidmore, Ownings & Merrill's 1952 Lever House established the "tower-in-a-plaza" urban design typology that the new resolution directly sought to spread over the City. In addition, when Robert Wagner Jr., Felt's predecessor as chair of the Planning Commission, first announced the need for a rezoning study in 1948, he did so

at a conference where efficient city planning was explicitly linked to large-scale redevelopment. For example, Robert W. Dowling, from the City Investment Company and a lead developer of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village, argued that "planned large-scale communities permitted more efficient use of valuable city land" (New York Times, April 9, 1948). Wagner also noted the connection between fiscal restraints and the City Planning Commission's support of modernist urbanism:

> We are fully aware of the fact that the practice of creating islands of modern developments, surrounded by blight, may be questionable when converted into long-term policy. However, with staff and budgetary restrictions the commission has been compelled to proceed slowly toward its objectives. (Ibid)

Therefore, the 1961 zoning resolution was a product of its time. Both political-economic circumstances and architectural trends led planners to the 1961 revisions of the zoning resolution. But the liberal impulse to plan for economic development also led to is adoption. The latter inefficiencies that emerged from the 1961 resolution's creation of "privately-owned public space" resulted from the City's usage of modern, functionalist urbanism for its open space aesthetic and real estate potential.

In the early 1970s, amidst economic decline and the withdrawal of large-scale federal subsidies for redevelopment programs, New York's planning department was challenged in finding the means to finance a new pursuit of urban forms for the development process. The two-part effort to instill the modernist value of street-level open space and re-engage the private sphere in the urban development process, turned entrepreneurial planners on to the concept of "privately-owned public space." The City utilized Mies van der Rohe's Seagram Building as model for providing a "general feeling of openness at street level" (12). The 1961 Zoning Resolution gave bulk bonuses to developers who wanted to build higher and bigger as long a portion of the lot was preserved as open space. Like the dumbbell tenement, the "tower-in-a-plaza" became the resultant form of the city's new building restrictions.

In 1993, the city reordered its formal preferences but continued to encourage the development of "privately-owned public space." In fulfillment of economic interests in redeveloping central business districts, and aesthetic interests in providing more street-level open space, design zoning paid little attention to the optimal provision of local public goods. After the proliferation of dismal, unwelcoming and heavily commercialized spaces that took the form of concealed plazas and

arcades (which seemingly discouraged lively city streets), the Urban Design Group abandoned the Miesian "tower-in-a-plaza" as its ideal development form. In its place, the city adopted the Battery Park City form of a "tower-on-a-base" in a concerted effort to regain the traditional block and street corridor that were lost with the plazas and arcades of privately-owned public space (19).

Indeed, the failure of "privately owned public space" to shape or play host to lively urban experiences signified the dearth of the policy's impact on social problems. Yet the public spaces did not intend to address social problems, rather they intended to provide modernist designed open spaces around privately built hi-rise developments. Though most of the benefits of such exclusionary provisions were limited to those who worked or lived in the buildings themselves, passersby, in theory, could still have benefited from the experience of open space along dense city streets. Thus, in effect, the policy privatized the provision of public space at street-level. And, in contrast to earlier zoning resolutions, which sought to prevent the encroachment of private development on the public right-of-way, the new policy required developers to privately provide and broaden the extent of the street's public realm.

This policy was heavily influenced by architectural theory that sought the integration of open space and urban densities. Yet, the encouragement of towers in plazas or on bases, and the inefficiencies of the policy's implementation, signified that planners were not responding to the local demand for more open space; rather, they were employing urban design simply as a means to procure newer, more aesthetically pleasing forms for their city streets. Therefore, while the creation of the Urban Design Group suggested that planners were more aware of how redeveloped urban forms could affect neighborhoods, the liberal impulse of planning policy and its formalist approach to urban design negated any consideration of the efficient provision of public space and the social impact of modernist forms. Urban planners again shortsightedly reduced urban design to a purely aesthetic guide for building more attractive cities.

In 2000, the New York City Department of City Planning, the Municipal Arts Society, and Jerold Kayden produced an inventory of all existing urban plazas and public spaces in the City. Accompanying this inventory was a historic review of the policy for "privately owned public space" in which Kayden observed that many of the policy's resultant spaces were unused on a day-to-day basis and concluded that the policy was "geographically indeterminate" (13). Though the New York City experience with zoning explicated a history of self-critical planning based upon

the effectiveness of the policy's resultant forms in meeting social objectives, Kayden et al. made no attempt to connect the policy with the inequities of planning outcomes or to "the policy for future public spaces" (vii). What was forfeited in the study was a rich opportunity for the City to become more analytical about the social relationship between its urban design policy and the ill use of public space. While developers were infringing upon the precious public realm of the city's densest territories (its business districts), the Zoning committee was accepting meager offerings of concession in the form of undesirable plazas and atriums that were originally only intended to serve the needs of the weekday business class. Though harm was does done to the local public realm of these buildings, developers were able to maximize their profits and floor area ratios. In the meantime, the likely users of the space, previous tenants, and any neighborhood residents were left with only an uninviting plaza bench in repayment. In more ways than one, the history of New York's zoning experience has been determined similar scenarios, whereby the planner's desire to fulfill social objectives has had little to do with challenging social inequality or finding the socially optimal outcomes for development.

The 1916 Zoning Resolution integrated planning issues over urban form, development, and public space into an efficient means for addressing matters of the private sphere. However, from a structuralist perspective the resolution only perpetuated the upper class's command over the urbanization process. In the conflict between the spatial practices of the working class garment workers and those of the affluent group of Fifth Avenue Merchants, the upper class prevailed by restricting the working class's command over the construction of local community.

Accordingly, before the resolution was passed, the garment workers were restricted from the ownership of the local means of production, and so, like all low-income populations, found that the only means to community formation was through continuous appropriation (i.e. utilizing the sidewalks of Fifth Avenue for interpersonal social relations). However, for the retailers, the construction of community was geared towards the preservation and enhancement of business and exchange values. The street-level interpersonal relations that were necessary in the appropriation of space for the construction of working class community were also detrimental to the exchange values of local retail businesses. Typically, affluent groups have taken actions to ameliorate the negative externalities on property values by changing the nature of community space. In this case, the merchants association sought zoning ordinances to prevent garment workers from acting as

nuisances to business (Harvey 1990, 260-261). In other words, the approval of the 1916 Zoning Resolution was an intra-urban class conflict, wherein "fundamentally different class mechanisms for defining the spatiality of community" came into conflict, and thus sparked a "running guerilla warfare over who appropriates and controls various spaces of the city" (277).

Urban Form as "Symbolic Capital"

While entrepreneurial planners have increased their focus on the urban forms of development through design zoning and attention to symbolic capital, the justifications for the planner's preference of certain forms has become more distanced from the local demand for public goods. Instead, the increased attention to form has been derivative of urban form's aesthetic value as a cultural and social symbol: a conceptual development stemming from post-modernism's exploration of urban form's as a social entity inextricably linked to cultural identity (Mumford 2000, 11).

Tim Love observed this movement within architectural theory. He observed a "renewed focus on the city in the late 1970s and early 1980s [that] was predicated on the spatial and morphological virtues of the traditional city" (Love 2006, 62). Spearheading this trend, Rowe and Koetter, characterized the public realm of the modernist city as an "apologetic ghost." Their seminal work, Collage City, created the theoretical groundwork that could later be used to criticize the urban forms of large-scale redevelopment and the 1961 zoning resolution.[14] Reference to historic urban forms, they argued, could create urban conditions the urban economist would appreciate wherein "both buildings and spaces exist in an equality of sustained debate. A debate in which victory consists in each component emerging undefeated, the imagined condition is a type of solid-void dialectic which might allow for the joint existence of the overtly planned and the genuinely unplanned…of the public and the private" (Ibid, 83).

The type of urban design emanating from Rowe and Koetter's book has shown potential in directing urban development in accordance with the local demand for public goods, like open space. For instance, new principles guiding the provision of privately owned public space have conceived of open space as "outdoor rooms carved from the fabric of the city" (Love 2006, 62). Yet, while

14 [I]f functionalism proposed an end to typologies in favour of a logical induction from concrete facts, it is precisely because it was unwilling to consider iconic significance as a concrete fact in itself, unwilling to imagine particular physical configurations as instruments of communication, that functionalism can have very little to say with reference to the deformation of ideal models. (Rowe and Koetter 1978, 77).

post-modern design theory has maintained an aesthetic interest in creating "an 'active urban realm' by maximizing 'active ground floor uses,'" post-modern urban design projects have concealed open space behind architectural abstractions of social objectives. New urban realities are crudely inserted as distant "improvements" to the urban realm.

These design parameters were used to build Battery Park City on an isolated landfill site at the tip of Lower Manhattan. The new physical urban environment encapsulated the transition from modernist to post-modernist urbanism. The traditional street corridor was regained through the pedestrian scaling of the "tower-on-a-base" form favored by the 1993 amendments to New York's zoning resolution. In addition, the open spaces, including its waterfront promenade, playgrounds, and parks were designed as pleasant hosts to vibrant recreational activity. However, its building codes produced a packaged physical environment that prevented variations in urban form and the provision of local public goods. As such, it could not accommodate a variety of income groups, and the dispersal of its benefits was limited to New York's most affluent. Referenced as a great public work, Battery Park City had shared the same social stratification of any luxurious suburban development.

More recent possibilities for large-scale urban design will further test the coherence between new trends in urban design and the need for planning to become more self-critical in its approach to urban form.

Conclusion: Public Goods in Today's Economy

The fiscal restraints of neo-conservatism have caused urban planning to adjust its methods for fulfilling social interests via urban development. However, planners have not forced themselves to find new urban forms for allocating local public goods. Rather, increases in the supply of local public goods have resulted from planning objectives formulated by economic interests. Changes in the quantities of local public goods have been associated with gentrification and have subsequently disadvantaged lower incomes who have been displaced by the sorting of households in relation to

the new quantity of public goods.[15]

The Atlantic Yards redevelopment in Brooklyn, New York forces us to question whether the social objectives behind urban planning have become more responsive to finding socially optimal outcomes in the process of urban development. Planners have indeed channeled their attention to sites where the direct displacement of residents through land condemnation is not required for large-scale redevelopment. Open rail yards have historically been used for this purpose, such as with the redevelopment of the Grand Central terminal in Manhattan. Recent urban plans to build on structural slabs over top of rail yards have suggested that planners have become aware of the connection between the inequalities of development and its displacement effects. But whether planners have become fully aware of the social impact of form is still an open issue. Analyzing the urban design and planning of the Atlantic Yards Redevelopment project allows us to further explore this issue.

15 In other examples of the housing sorting process, the contruction of new housing for higher incomes generally allows all incomes to improve their housing situation. However, because urban planning is concerned with urban economic development through increases in the labor supply, it is not assumed that lower incomes will be able to improve their housing situation. Relocation (as something distinct from displacement) entails social costs, which, in theory, are covered by the public benefits offered by economic development. However, displacement carries with a variety of social costs that are not necessary outweighed by the social benefits of economic development.

CHAPTER 3: FORMALIST URBAN PLANNING AND THE ATLANTIC YARDS PROPOSAL

The pending proposal for the Atlantic Yards can be imagined as an encapsulating test case for the study of current trends in liberal urban planning, large-scale redevelopment, and the private (or public-private) provision of public goods. Historical changes in the Atlantic Yards neighborhood have followed the macrocosmic political-economic transformations in what David Harvey has termed the "motif of urban action" for American cities. Moreover, the historical record for redevelopment schemes in the area have revealed an adherence to ideological movements which have been determinant of the degree to which formal contextualization through design has occurred.

To further this discussion, and draw it to a conclusion, this chapter will analyze the Atlantic Yards proposal in terms of its plan, design, and urban context.

Planning History of Neighborhoods in the Atlantic Yards Footprint

The state of the land and neighborhoods encompassing the proposed footprint of the Atlantic Yards project is the result of over one hundred and fifty years of city planning endeavors. Before the intense suburbanization patterns of the mid-twentieth century, Olmsted and Vaux's landscape and urban design projects and the role of local transportation facilities helped determine the sorting of households in the area. The resultant sorting patterns rendered the surrounding blocks of the rail yards largely undesirable in the real estate market. Recent revitalization of the area has been supported by a general surge in the New York City real estate market and redevelopment plans spearheaded by public agencies.

Brooklyn City Planning Precedents

In the mid-nineteenth century, Olmsted and Vaux were busy designing parks all across the United States. Among their relevant projects, the team of landscape architects designed Central Park in 1858 and the 30-acre Fort Greene Park in 1867 that accompanied their plans in 1866 for Prospect Park and a more expansive metropolitan system of parks and parkways for the Brooklyn borough. The sustainable marketability of Olmsted and Vaux's aesthetically pleasing urban design projects forced the center of Brooklyn's middle-to-upper class development towards the Eastern Parkway, Fort Greene Park, and Prospect Park. Thus, by design and plan, Olmsted and Vaux lured households away from the Atlantic Yards site at the southeastern end of the Flatbush and Atlantic

Avenue intersection. Simultaneously, the landscape team established a modern, naturalized context for the design of urban forms that was extremely localized to New York City, if not for the Borough of Brooklyn itself.

Rail transportation facilities at the Atlantic Yards would also discourage stable development nearby. Just one year after Olmsted and Vaux issued their proposal for a metropolitan park system, Brooklyn's municipal government granted the Long Island Railroad the right to lay tracks in the center of Atlantic Avenue for 4.5 miles from Flatbush Avenue east to the district of East New York.

At this time, the Atlantic Avenue corridor was only lighted populated and laid largely in farmland. However, by May 18th 1897, residential development had been great enough that the nuisance of the tracks and steam trains led the municipality to mandate the removal of the tracks from the surface of Atlantic Avenue: a measure which the state later endorsed in 1901.

Between 1902 and 1904 the railroad company constructed a combination of below grade and elevated train lines along the Atlantic Avenue thoroughfare. The section around Atlantic Yards consisted only of an open, below-grade cut with concrete walls and flooring. The emissions of the open yard and the sheer volume of trains from the Long Island Railroad, the Brooklyn Rapid Transit, and the Inter-Borough Rail Transit (which all circulated around the Flatbush terminus) deterred development away from the Atlantic Avenue area (Condit 1980, 312-319).

Households also sorted in respect to the newly created public amenities offered in the surrounding Brooklyn neighborhoods. The foci of three of the Yards' bordering neighborhoods—Fort Greene, Prospect Heights, and Park Slope—were each located away from the open rail yard and closer to Prospect and Fort Greene Parks. Park Slope, which was situated directly southwest of the Atlantic Yards, was undeveloped until the 1870s, when Prospect Park was built and horse-drawn rail cars reached the area. During this period, the neighborhood's first four story brownstone row houses were erected. Because of the availability of open space and increased accessibility to Manhattan (mainly after the completion of the Brooklyn Bridge in 1883), Park Slope began to draw wealthier citizens who built mansions along Prospect Park West (Brooklyn's "Gold Coast") and rivaled the luxury of Manhattan's 5th Avenue.

On the north side of Flatbush Avenue, similar sorting in Prospect Heights was taking place in respect to the newly created public transportation lines, Prospect Park, and Olmsted and Vaux's elegant but naturalist streetscape design for Eastern Parkway. In 1873, a promotional pamphlet

issued by the neighborhood's real estate developer read as follows:

> The Eastern Parkway when completed will be the finest street in the world. This is probably the grandest attempt ever made by [the] force of law to make a district of a city fashionable and exclusive….The supreme law of the State protects this whole district from the possibility of any nuisance. Even the mere semblance to an offense can be crushed and annihilated. (Macdonald 2005, 302).

Privately enforced but legally protected neighborhood covenants were utilized to maintain the residential ideal embodied by the area's lavish mansions and Olmsted and Vaux's vision for central Brooklyn. Later, the Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn Public Library, Brooklyn Children's Museum, and the Brooklyn Botanic Gardens, all planned in 1843 by Vaux as Institute Park, contributed in making the southern reaches of both Prospect Heights and Crown Heights more desirable on New York City's greater real estate market (Jackson, Manbeck 1998, 179).

Meanwhile, in the Fort Greene Neighborhood, development was also partially determined by the planning efforts of the Brooklyn Parks Commission and the landscape design of Olmsted and Vaux. Before 1850, when the 30 acres around the historic Fort Greene were designated as parkland, the surrounding neighborhood was home to a community of Irish immigrants and a few shanties on open farmland. But it soon became prone to conflict between development and gentrification. When Fort Greene Park's designation was made in the 1850s, the Brooklyn Common Council had been trying to restrict the rearing of pigs in the area in spite of a locally established Irish community, which in some way was dependent on its livestock. In response to the refusal of the Irish immigrants to embrace redevelopment, the City simply displaced the residents. The New York Times reported on the conditions:

> At length a general and concerted attack was made upon pigdeon by the Police; the pens were all demolished and the pigs ran about the streets. Their main stay thus removed a general hegira of the inhabitants soon occurred: their shanties were pulled down and, gathering up their household goods, they moved far out of town, where it was supposed the advancing tide of civilization would never overtake them. (New York Times, February 24, 1858).

In conjunction with Fort Greene Park and the employment opportunities at Brooklyn Navy Yards, residential development after 1850 was spurred by the completion of the Brooklyn Bridge and an elevated railway, which ran along Fulton Street. Wealthier residents considered the elevated railway and the Atlantic Avenue Long Island Railroad line a nuisance and built their

mansions and four-story brownstones north of Fulton Street and closer to the park and thereby forced the neighborhood's poorer, Black residents south towards the Atlantic Yards. By 1900, 40 percent of Brooklyn's Black population lived in the strip of land extending westward from Flatbush Avenue between Atlantic Avenue and Fulton Street (Connolly 1977, 43-44). Thus, in 1978, when the Landmarks Preservation Commission designated the Fort Greene Historic District, its southern boundary line extended along Fulton Street and excluded the residences immediately north of the rail yards (Historic Districts Council, 2007). Until city sponsored redevelopment in the 1960s, development in this neglected strip of land was unproductive, except for the Long Island Railroad Terminal and the Fort Greene Meat Market at the Flatbush-Atlantic intersection.

To recap: though the Atlantic Yards and the Long Island Railroad served crucial roles in Brooklyn's rail transportation network, their negative externalities discouraged the upscale residential development that occurred in other sections of the surrounding neighborhoods. In the one hundred years between the neighborhoods' initial growth and eventual decline, Prospect Heights' and Park Slope's wealthier, white citizens chose to locate in closer proximity to Prospect Park and Brooklyn's campus for cultural institutions. In Fort Greene, wealthier households clustered around Fort Greene Park, away from the noise and unsightliness of local rail transportation facilities. In 1898, when Brooklyn became a borough of New York City, commercial and manufacturing development occurred on the land abutting the Atlantic Yards. However, during the latter half of the twentieth century, the expansive negative externalities of the rail yards posed a perennial problem for Brooklyn city planners.

Economic Decline in Brooklyn

When Robert Moses came to New York City in the early 1930s, Long Island's population (which included Brooklyn) was well over four million and greater than all but eight states. Yet, at the same time, there was not a single vehicular link between Long Island and the mainland United States. The Queensborough, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Williamsburg bridges were the only vehicular routes off of Long Island, and they all emptied traffic into congested Manhattan streets. After twenty years of Moses' road and highway construction campaigns, Long Island finally could enjoy vehicular connections to New England and Upstate New York as the late 20th century aproached (Caro 1974, 329-331).

Meanwhile, passenger rail transportation had also opened Long Island to suburbanization. In 1910, the Long Island Railroad (LIRR) was purchased by the Pennsylvania Railroad and was given access to the newly built Penn Station (1904), which allowed connection to New Jersey, Connecticut, and Upstate New York. As a result, the importance of the Flatbush Terminal on Atlantic Avenue was marginalized by the increasing number of Long Island commuters who could now travel directly to central Manhattan without making connections with the New York City transit system in Brooklyn and Queens. The number LIRR passengers heading to Penn Station had risen from around six million in 1911 to almost thirty-four million in 1924 (New York Times, April 14, 1925). Though the number of passengers reaching the Flatbush Terminal continued to rise during the same period, the Long Island Railroad Company refused to improve the terminal after it was built in 1905—an action which signified its decline in importance. At a public hearing in 1930, George LeBoutillier, the company's vice president, informed city officials of the LIRR's plans to divest from its Atlantic Avenue operations in order to focus on its suburban lines into Penn Station. The Long Island line, he said, was not designed to handle inner-city rapid transit; and he also hoped that new city subways would allow the company to abandon all stations along the Atlantic Avenue line between Jamaica and Flatbush Avenues (New York Times, February 5, 1930). Altogether, from 1900 to 1930, ridership on the Long Island Railroad increased by almost tenfold to 118 million passengers while the average length of trips increased over this time period as well. Both figures documented the population growth of eastern Long Island (Long Island Railroad 1934, 3, 14; New York Times, April 14, 1925).

The accessibility of eastern Long Island facilitated the suburban flight of wealthier Brooklynites who had been living in Park Slope, Prospect Heights, and Fort Greene. Though people and jobs typically follow each other, suburbanization on Long Island followed different patterns; and the accessibility of jobs in downtown Brooklyn changed as well. The uniqueness of Long Island was observed by spokespeople for the Long Island Railroad Company who characterized the base of its operations in 1934:

> There are no large industries on the Long Island Railroad to create freight traffic. In consequence, three-quarters of its revenues are derived from carrying passengers. This directly reverses the general rule, which is that American railroads, as a whole, earn about three-quarters of their total revenues from freight. (The Long Island Railroad 1934, 3).

Moses' highway projects only perpetuated suburbanization patterns on Long Island. By encouraging officials to zone the land bordering the highways as residential, Moses sought to prevent manufacturing and commercial uses of land from ruining the natural sights along his bucolic parkways. While the population of Suffolk County grew by 200,000 in the decade after the Southern State Parkway was built, only 12,000 jobs were added during the same period (Caro 1974, 899).

Neither people nor jobs were staying in Brooklyn. The marginalization of the Flatbush Terminal after the LIRR gained access to Penn Station signaled the overall decline of Brooklyn as a center of commerce and industry. Despite the rebuilding of the Flatbush Terminal with the electrification of the Atlantic Avenue LIRR line in 1906, by the 1950s the terminal was considered "obsolete" by city officials who wished to condemn the adjacent slum areas and build the new Dodgers Stadium on the same site (New York Times, August 8, 1955). In 1965, the New York Times reported forty-three vacant storefronts on the one-mile stretch of Flatbush Avenue between Dekalb Avenue and Grand Army Plaza and fourteen deserted stores on Hanson Place in the single block extending away from the Flatbush Terminal (New York Times, September 5, 1965).

Another major factor in the loss of jobs in Brooklyn, and specifically in the Fort Greene neighborhood, was the closing of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, which employed over 18,000 people in World War I and over 70,000 people during World War II. It was decommissioned in 1966 by the U.S. military and later sold to the City of New York. At the time of its closing, the Yard employed only 9,000 people (Brooklyn Navy Yard Industrial Park 2007). In the same year, the area surrounding the Flatbush Terminal earned the city's official recognition as a "slum area;" and the City's urban renewal commission began requesting funds for what was renamed the "Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area" (New York Times, July 6, 1966).

The negative externalities of the exposed rail yards at the Flatbush and Atlantic Avenue intersection did nothing to discourage suburbanization, the withdrawal of investment, and the general deterioration of the Brooklyn Borough. The development of the rail yards was in and of itself a large-scale project. To ameliorate its negative externalities, a large-scale redevelopment was needed and pursued in the construction of a new Brooklyn Dodgers stadium. When the main occupant of the redevelopment's rentable space—the Dodgers—backed out of the deal, the project failed and the city's goal to redevelop the area persisted. The inflexibility to urban redevelopment of the Atlantic Yards was affirmed. The yards remained untouched and a persistent problem to future

New York City planners.

Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area

Later redevelopment plans would yet again reinforce the inflexibility of the Atlantic Yards and large-scale urban infrastructure in general. Moreover, transitions in the mode of urban action that occurred in New York City would reappear in the Atlantic Yards area. For instance, political opposition and fiscal restraints implemented by neo-conservative regimes would further hinder the public sphere's ability to sponsor the site's redevelopment.

The Brooklyn planner's approach to urban form throughout the latter half of the twentieth century was also consistent with architectural and urbanism movements, which purposefully rejected the naturalist aesthetic of Olmstedian design. The rigid geometries of Le Corbusian urban forms were utilized for redevelopment until the mid-1990s, when the City realigned its formal preferences in accordance with anti-modernist and post-modernist architectural virtues. Before the shift to contextualism in the latter 20th century, planners also utilized modernist forms in a manner indicative of their liberal tendencies to eschew economic efficiency and the intra-urban class conflict at work in the process of urban form making.

Brooklyn planners began thinking of new ways to achieve the same redevelopment goals after the Nixon administration terminated the entire federal urban renewal program in 1973. For the Atlantic Yards this meant a redirection in the type of land use. Instead of housing development, planners pursued commercial and office space developments as part of the goal to bring "back office" space to Brooklyn and away from Eastern New Jersey (New York Times, July 31, 1985). The cleared land at the northeastern corner of the Flatbush Avenue and Atlantic Avenue intersection was subjected to plans for office and commercial towers sponsored by private developers. Although initial plans failed, what became of these efforts was the redevelopment of the L.I.R.R Atlantic Terminal, which had been torn down by the city and transformed into the Atlantic Center Mall and a new office building for the New York Bank.

It was not until the mid-1990s when the form of redevelopment would rediscover the context for the local urban forms established by Olmsted and Vaux. The New York City Partnership, which first came to Fort Greene in 1984 under a city-wide goal to bring architectural variety to urban renewal programs, helped build the Village at Atlantic Center in 1996 (New York Times, November

9, 1984; Hudson Companies 2007). The development consisted of 139 three-family homes that advertised their "attractive brick front and decorative cornices that complimented the historic row houses characteristic of the neighborhood" (Hudson Companies 2007). In contrast, across the street, the design of the Atlantic Terminal Houses relied on abstraction to invent an urban context in the modern, Brutalist tradition. According to the architect, James Stewart Polshek, the buildings he designed "'depended upon the painterly use of different colored bricks for its iconography'" rather than familiar Brooklyn streetscapes and brownstone facades. (Stern, et. al. 1995, 912). The latter, more contextualized Village development also retained a division between private and public open space. Each home enjoyed a private courtyard, while a park taking up half a city block between Cumberland and Oxford Streets provided a small but useful amount of public space.

Other projects signifying positive redevelopment with respect to local form have since been made, including the renovation of the Newswalk loft building and the construction of the Cumberland Gardens, a low-income senior citizens building, and a similar 9-story brick and limestone condominium building.

The yards and the southern end of the ATURA boundaries remained as they had since the city established the urban renewal area in the 1960s. As such, the yards themselves have continued to generate negative externalities. Though plans for building on top of the yards were regularly discussed, the economic opportunity for such an endeavor was never apparent. That was the case until present times, when the surrounding property values have soared high enough to make development of the yards a profitable endeavor. However, despite the increase in local property values, the southern ATURA properties have persisted as blighted areas according to the ESDC, the present state authority for spearheading redevelopment in cooperation with Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC). As such, and in consideration of other public benefits foreseen from the project, the ECDC has justified public sponsorship of the project despite the obvious controversy with local residents over the urban character of their neighborhood.

The following section will examine the plan of the project in tandem with its foreseen benefits. The opposition to the project will then be briefly discussed to illustrate the particular elements of the project that local residents do not want. Then a conclusion will be reached over the project in respect to the larger picture of large-scale redevelopment.

The Plan

On December 8, 2006, the Empire State Development Corporation adopted its "Modified General Project" for the "Atlantic Yards Land Use Improvement and Civic Project" in accordance with the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act. The project comprised the construction of a large-scale redevelopment in the southern section of the ATURA area of Brooklyn. Encompassing approximately 22-acres, the "project site is roughly bounded by Flatbush and 4th Avenues to the west, Vanderbilt Avenue to the east, Atlantic Avenue to the north, and Dean and Pacific Streets to the south and includes the approximately 9-acre (including the land under the 6th and Carlton Avenue Bridges), below-grade Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) Vanderbilt Storage Yard (the "LIRR Yard") and the MTA storage yard for inactive NYCT buses (the "MTA Yard"; together with the LIRR Yard, the "Yard[s]"). (ESDC, General Project Plan 2006, 1)

The project's proposal entailed "the development of an arena, 16 mixed-use buildings and a newly reconfigured LIRR train yard, generally, to be developed within two phases" (3). The phase 1 site included a new arena for the New Jersey Nets National Basketball Association Team and "five other buildings with commercial office and retail, residential, community facility and potentially hotel uses and a new subway entrance," in addition to the reconfiguration of the western end of the yards (Ibid). This phase would concentrate the greatest commercial activity closest to the Flatbush and Atlantic Avenue intersection and Brooklyn's major transportation hub, the Atlantic Terminal, where ten subways and 11 bus lines come together. Phase 2 would cover the eastern end of the project, east of 6th Avenue. It would include a platform building pad to be constructed in the air space of the yards at street grade. "The Platform, combined with the existing at-grade parcels…and the bed of Pacific Street between Carlton and Vanderbilt Avenues, would allow for the planning, reorganization and redevelopment of these currently underutilized blocks. Eleven buildings would be developed on the [phase 2] site with primarily residential uses and a number of local retail and community facility uses," including a public school at the expense of the New York City Department of Education (4).

The construction of the project is planned to occur in two phases, with the phase 1 site to be completed by 2010 and phase 2 to be completed by 2016 (Ibid). The buildings of the site have been designed by the architect Frank Gehry, and the open—8 acres of "environmentally sustainable, publicly accessible open space"—would be designed by landscape architect Laurie Olin, accredited with the Battery Park City Promenade and the redeveloped Bryant Park at 42nd street in Manhattan

(7).

The benefits are projected to be just as large as the project itself. From the ESDC's perspective and a compendium of the project's supporters:[16]

> "The Project would result in a signature mixed-use, mixed income development at one of Brooklyn's most important crossroads. This development would create a considerable number of jobs in Brooklyn, help address New York City's substantial housing needs and generate significant revenues for the City and State. The project would transform what is currently a blighted and underutilized site into a development that incorporates world-class architecture, a dynamic streetscape, and significant public amenities for the entire borough" (7).

The theoretical framework for the benefits of the project have been conceived within the liberal constructs of urban planning; that is, the Atlantic Yards project would be useful to Brooklyn, the City of New York, and the State of New York because of its potential for economic development, a political goal in and of itself supported by both state and local politicians and scattered groups of local residents.

The Costs and Benefits

Part of the debate over the Atlantic Yards revolves around the project's fiscal impact on the City of New York and Brooklyn. Forest City Ratner hired a sports economist at Smith College, Andrew Zimbalist, to measure and project these figures. In his study, the "Estimated Fiscal Impact of the Atlantic Yards Project on the New York City and New York State Treasuries," Zimbalist concluded that there would be a new positive fiscal impact with a present value of $812.7 million from the project (Zimbalist 2005, 33). "The present value in 2005 of the estimated tax revenues over a 30-year period to the city and state from the Atlantic Yards project," he argued, "is at least $1.503 billion" (Ibid). Yet, these figures were based on his "assumption that 40 percent of the households previously lived in New York State" (Ibid, fn. 35).

Zimbalist's assumptions are indicative of New York's emergence as global city and the

16 According to the Forest City Ratner's website "The Atlantic Yards development issupported by a wide range of elected officials, unions, community leaders, issue advocates, urban development experts, religious leaders and organizations, local businesses and thousands of fans all across Brooklyn and the New York are.... These supporters include Governor Pataki, Mayor Bloomberg, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressman Edolphus Towns, Congressman Gregory W. Weeks, Congressman Anthony Weiner, Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum, Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr. and Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz" (http://www.atlanticyards.com, "Supporters" page, 2007).
From the author's own observations at a Community Board #8 hearing on the project, the supporters argued for the project based on its potential for economic development, jobs, and affordable housing.

rescaling of the urban planning's strategic territory in general. Planners are no longer concerned with districts and boroughs as Olmsted and Vaux, they have been required to extend their approach to a regional perspective, which for New York City includes most of the eastern seaboard. Zimbalist embraced this approach when he calculated the costs and benefits of the project in terms of the state and the city. However, in this case and in other planning scenarios, the project's social costs, which Zimbalist did not measure at all, would be limited to the neighborhoods immediately surrounding the site of redevelopment.

Thus, the liberal calculations of costs and benefits pertaining to the Atlantic Yards have been made irrespective of the variation of urban forms and land use across the city. Recent arguments for the development of the global city have followed this line, whereby city planners have subordinated local interests to the objective interest of remaining economically competitive on the global scale. As such, in working to implement more efficient urban planning policy on a local level, in addition to calculating the fiscal costs and benefits of a proposed project, the marginal social costs and benefits should be approximated in regards to the residents directly affected by a project's planning and design.

Though planners have interpreted the public benefits of development in terms of the state and city, the City of New York is large enough and diverse enough that calculations of public costs and benefits should be confined to specific areas defined by the prevalent land use and accompanying urban form and iconography. In the past, the policy of "privately-owned public space" assumed that the private sphere's offerings of open space through "bonusable" plazas would be good for the general public. However, many of the spaces went unused even though developers still received bulk bonuses and built bigger and taller buildings that infringed upon the public right-of-way. While the policy strove to meet economic and aesthetically oriented objectives through the private provision of open space, the original code for privately owned public space was inefficient because of its negligence towards local preferences for public goods. Alternatively, the revamped policy encouraged a heightened sense of responsibility for the design of "bonusable" space. However, formal modifications to the design of privately owned public space have not necessarily rectified the policy's deficiencies. In addition, planners should be attuned to the context for urban form making as it is revealed by the local demand and preference for public goods, such as open space and idyllic streetscapes. Moreover, the proposed urban forms of any planning or design project

should be questioned in regards to the social meaning of form and should be accompanied by some measurement of the marginal costs and benefits that encapsulate the full compendium of design possibilities. For example, while skyscrapers might be preferable in Manhattan (where many benefits could be produced because the marginal social costs of one more skyscraper would be quite low), in a neighborhood of four-story brownstones the marginal costs of a skyscraper would be quite high because of the building's infringement upon the public-right-of-way and its incongruence with local urban forms. Additionally, a skyscraper may enhance the social networks of a central business district while completely eradicate the street-focused communal activity of a residential neighborhood.

This approach to form was present when developers first began building remarkably taller and bulkier buildings in Manhattan. The public protests to skyscrapers forced the City to adopt the 1916 Zoning Resolution to prevent new buildings from devaluing nearby public and private property. When the next 1961 Zoning Resolution was passed, the City did not challenge the infringement of skyscrapers on private or public space; rather, as it stated, it searched to provide more economical design parameters for developers. Thus, bulky-skyscraper-development was still a problem for the public right of way, however its social costs were confined by the 1916 Zoning Resolution's definition of what land uses could take form in Manhattan's two central business districts. Because the skyscraper is now the context for urban form in Midtown and Downtown, four-story row houses should not be built in these areas because the marginal costs of such developments would be extremely high due to the sub-optimal use of land. As such, when large-scale urban design projects abut neighborhoods with strong formal precedents, plans to create new, pluralistic urban realities run contrary to both local preferences for urban forms and pre-existing bid rent patterns.

In the Atlantic Terminal area, local urban forms are associated with the four-story brownstone rowhouse and the Olmstedian paradigm for naturalistic urban design. There is but one skyscraper in the area—the Williamsburg Savings Bank Tower, whose tall clock tower stands as monument for the Borough. Though the buildings of Frank Gehry's design might also intend to become monumental in effect, their imposition on the Brooklyn skyline would largely overshadow the pre-existing urban forms of the surrounding neighborhoods. Despite this possibility, Gehry's buildings would act as resources of symbolic capital and could fulfill urban planning objectives to market Brooklyn as a new center for business and culture.

The Use of Eminent Domain

The debate around the Atlantic Yards project can also be approached via the politics of economic development. The proposal represents a developmental opportunity for the rail yards, wherein new housing and commercial space can be built without the otherwise politically problematic direct displacement of local residents (Garvin, pers. Comm., March 22, 2007). Moreover, the Atlantic Yards Redevelopment's proposed scale and required usage of eminent domain have brought forth larger social implications associated with the public sponsorship of large-scale urban design projects. Primarily, this thesis aims to associate these implications with the social costs, which include (but are not limited to) displacement and the fracturing of social networks, associated with such projects. A disproportionate amount of the burden of these costs has allegedly been absorbed by politically weak, lower class communities located nearby the project sites. In contrast, the social benefits have been more structurally grounded within the liberal basis for urban planning and more culturally abstract concepts regarding the furtherance of a city's supply of symbolic capital.

Approximately 40 percent (9 of 22 acres) of the proposed Atlantic Yards site is occupied by open rail and bus yards, but the remaining area is "occupied by a mix of uses, including industrial and warehouse buildings, auto repair shops and gas stations, parking lots, residential buildings, and commercial uses as well as vacant lots" (ESDC 2006, Blight Study, A-1). Though Forest City Ratner has reached agreements with the MTA regarding the acquisition of the rail yards, the use of eminent is still needed to acquire some of the other parcels that complete the project site.

In October 2006, local residents and owners of these properties filed a federal eminent domain lawsuit against the state ESDC, the City of New York, the New York City Economic Development Corporation, and the developer's subsidiaries. At the time of writing, the suits were still in courts but their trial undoubtedly drew into question the public use of the project and the overall use of eminent domain for economic development.

Kelo v. the City of New London was quickly referenced in the proceedings of the Atlantic Yard cases. In this case, the petitioners claimed that the taking of their unblighted properties for a publicly sponsored redevelopment project would violate the "'public use' restriction in the Fifth Amendment (Kelo v. New London 2005, 5). The court upheld the city's use of eminent domain to acquire the properties by maintaining that "there is no basis for exempting economic development

from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose" (15). Furthermore, it was held that the court did not have the authority to question to whether economic development would actually take place. This question was the responsibility of the legislature (14). However, the court admitted that this could change:

> We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power…As the submissions of the parties and their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate. This Court's authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. (19)

The amici curiae were also noteworthy, including Jane Jacobs, John Norquist, President of the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU), and Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB), the main oppositional organization to the Atlantic Yards project.

Jacobs again explored the dialectic between urban development and social conflict. In her brief, she first argued that condemnation through eminent domain is not necessary to promote comprehensive economic development (Jacobs 2004, 13). She also interpreted eminent domain as yet another device through which the ruling classes have exerted their authority of the lower classes. "Development condemnations," she claimed, "disproportionately victimize the poor and minorities [as] the properties of poor and politically weak owners are more likely to be targeted for condemnation than those of wealthy and influential ones" (11).

Her brief concluded that economic development should no longer be utilized to justify condemnation. As such, she posited that "the economic development rationale can justify almost any takings that benefits a commercial enterprise" (Jacobs 2004, 16). The Supreme of Court of Michigan validated this position in a decision cited by Jacobs, Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786:

> [The] 'economic benefit' rationale would validate practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private property is forever subject to the government's determination that another private party would put one's land to better use then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion of plans of any large discount retailer, 'megastore,' or the like.

Moreover, like the Court itself, Jacobs left room for the improvement of eminent domain use based on economic development. "If this Court chooses not to ban economic development condemnations," she wrote, "it should at least require courts to consider the social costs of

condemnation and compel the new owners of expropriated property to accept a binding obligation to produce the economic benefits that justify condemnation in the first place" (Jacobs, 3004: 29). Under this stipulation, the developer would be expected to cover the social costs of the redevelopment project.

It wasn't hard for DDDB to recognize the relevance of Kelo v. New London to the Atlantic Yards Redevelopment. Similarly troubled as the Court of Michigan in Hathcock, DDDB argued that private property should not be compromised and community fabrics should not destroyed when the takings clause is justified by "an entirely speculative economic benefit" (Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. et al. 2004, 15).

Though the ESDC and FCRC could confine redevelopment to the 9-acres occupied by the rail yards, it has chosen to pursue land condemnation despite the attached displacement effects. Their rationale being that increases in the site acreage can increase the project's financial projections and chances of success in terms of New York City's upscaling of the strategic territory for its entrepreneurial urban planning tactics. Thus, the decision to pursue land condemnation is one made in furtherance of the city's global economic competitiveness and the upper class's command over the urbanization process. As such, the redevelopment plan suggests that the urban planning practice has remained unresponsive to the class biases of urban development as they are represented by the design of urban forms.

Urban Design and Form

The argument for the use of eminent domain has been historically predicated upon the assumption that for every piece of land, redevelopment inevitably produces a more optimal urban form. For instance, in Berman v. Parker, the Court held that "blighted" forms, "as though possessed of a congenital disease," are deserving of condemnation because their replacement would undoubtedly improve the use of land for the public's interest (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 1954: 33). The Supreme Court , though, in Kelo v. New London stipulated that no court should ever question the probability of economic development in cases regarding the takings clause (2005, 5). Nevertheless, even while avoiding financial estimation, the courts, planners, and other stakeholders in the urban development process might together improve eminent domain's protection of the public's interest by calling into question the expected efficiency of the proposed form and design

of the redevelopment. This next section provides an example of how this might be done with the Atlantic Yards project.

The ESDC has established Design Guidelines for the organization and articulation of the plan's phases, buildings, open space, and streetscapes. This thesis will examine two parts of the design guidelines: the design guidelines for the residential buildings on Dean Street between Carlton and Vanderbilt, and the fragmentation of public and private space at the project's eastern end.

The architectural and urban forms of the Dean Street buildings and the divisions between private and public space in these areas help define the physical character of Prospect Heights. Traveling south from Dean Street up Carlton Avenue to Prospect Park, one can walk with Jane Jacob's Death and Life of Great American Cities in hand and discern the formal elements that effectively distinguish private and public space. Knee-high gates, for example, divide the public space of the sidewalk from the private spaces inside the block's four-story brownstone row houses.[17] The buildings themselves form a street corridor with parallel walls to secure the safety of the street and delineate the cleavage between the public-right-of-way and private residential space.

Instead of conforming to the local forms of the neighborhood, the buildings planned for Dean Street have been designed with a new set of parameters. While these guidelines might lead to visually exciting and culturally symbolic built forms, they do not respect the local demand for the provision of open space explicated by the local residents' preferences for the iconic, Olmstedian formal vocabulary. For example, Building 13, to be located on Dean Street between Vanderbilt and Carlton Avenues, is expected to "incorporate a visually distinctive architectural element in the rear façade of the Building…Such element may include without limitation curvilinear, fragmented, or multi-planar forms" (ESDC, "Design Guidelines," 2006, 16). The built forms expected by the ESDC are quite contrary to the rectilinear, unified, and planar forms of the existing neighborhood's naturalist urban design.

Significantly, the ESDC made an effort to acknowledge the local context for urban design by writing building heights, street wall requirements, and setbacks into the Guidelines. Building

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17 The majority of the housing structures in the neighborhood, which is defined by the five census tracks around the Atlantic Yards project site in Fort Greene, Prospect Heights, and Park Slope, are structures with 3 to 9 units. Only 22.6 percent of the housing structures have more than 20 units. Furthermore, 95.2 percent of the housing units in the neighborhoods are occupied (5,542 out of 5,819), and the majority of vacant housing units (153 out of 277) are for rent. U.S. Census Data.

14, planned for the intersection of Dean Street and Carlton Avenue, has a maximum base height of 90 feet, which is comparable to the Newswalk condominium building to the west but considerably higher than a four-story brownstone. All portions of the building taller than this must be set back from the Dean Street frontage. In addition, it shall "incorporate a minimum of 1 vertical architectural break in the building base on the Dean Street façade and a minimum of 1 vertical architectural break in the building base and building shoulder on the Carlton Avenue façade, each within the vertical architectural break zones" of the development's envelop (Ibid). Overall, this envelope can be read as an attempt to visually communicate with the local buildings by maintaining the existing street corridor and by establishing fluctuations in building heights to flirt with formal precedents.

Though attempting to contextualize itself, the architecture of the project represents a drastic variation on local forms. The project takes conventions in local urban forms and subverts them to the creation of a new, abstract urban reality that conforms to social objectives but simultaneously generates fierce local protest. Though the new reality could potentially aid in branding the area as a new downtown for Brooklyn, local groups have opposed its attempt to redefine the cultural identity of the area's physical environment. They have particularly attacked the scale of the project. Develop Don't Destroy has published renderings of the project's scale with large, abstracted multi-planar forms that were depicted as bulky and grotesque violations of existing architectural conditions. The controversy generated in the comment period of the General Project Plan led the City Planning Commission to suggest scale-backs, which Forest City Ratner and the ESDC followed by implementing several bulk reductions, all less than 10 percent.

Aside from scale, the design guidelines also lack strong parameters for regulating the demarcation between private and public space—a formal element that is both indispensable and defining of the existing urban conditions. Microforms of privately owned open space: front courtyards lining the streets of Prospect Heights are lost; and, all open space is relegated to the interior, bounded sections of residential blocks. Ignored is the typically used form for creating a break between the public space of sidewalks and the quasi-public open space of front courtyards. Instead, a new type of transition is created wherein private walls lead a procession to "publicly accessible open space" beyond "openings" and "primary access points" (Ibid: 41). While illusionary boundaries exist in the design's intent, there will be no physical boundaries (such as a fence or façade) because the guidelines call for a "clear and unobstructed walkway with a minimum width

of 18 feet" (Ibid). In contrast, at Fort Greene Park and Prospect Park the transition between the multiple layers of the public realm (i.e. the boundaries between the public space of the sidewalks and the public open space of the park) occurs over two-dimensional forms, such as low fences, walls, and gates. While subverting these existing conditions for the composition of public space, the ESDC design guidelines aim to distance the publicly accessible open space from the public sidewalks with massive, privately owned, three dimensional forms which will become residential buildings. Though "publicly accessible," the users of the open space must transgress the private realm created by the buildings. Therefore, even though the experience of the primary access points is intended to avoid the feeling of exclusivity, the open nine acres would be entirely surrounded by a dense layer of private space unfamiliar to any of the local parks.

Undemocratic by Design

The project's design survives post-modern urbanism's acknowledgement of architecture's association with intra-urban class conflict. However, while post-modern theory asks for a sustained debate between private and public space, the design-minded planners of the Atlantic Yards have negated this by producing forms of public space that are merely formal, aesthetic concessions for infringements upon the public right-of-way. As such, contextualization with local conditions is sought by the guidelines' scale requirements and open space specifications, yet the resultant architecture cannot avoid being the urban construct of bourgeois community formation. The synthesis of these cultural forces and the aforementioned political economic interests at stake has created a design that is heavily contradictory with the formal preferences of local residents, whose median income is half that of the foreseen tenants (See above. For the area surrounding the footprint, the median income is $54,553.00, U.S. Census Data). The urban planning practice has supported this schism between democracy and design in fulfillment of its own social objective to encourage development via the expansion of socially hegemonic spatial practices. It follows that a more thoughtful handling of local, formal architectural and urban traditions would limit the degree to which the upper class commands the production of space in the proposed project. Thus, there exist both urban forms that encourage social equality and forms that perpetuate the historical production of its antithesis.

Moreover, the project's proposed urban and architectural forms both intend to shape and

be shaped by their provision of local public goods, such as open and public space. Because the foreseen forms are different from the existing forms of the neighborhood, the local supply of the public goods in question (i.e. open and public space) will take on new dimensions, albeit unfitting to the existing community. Even though the use of land on the blighted properties of the project site might be sub-optimal (as determined by the ESDC), the proposed forms of its redevelopment are sub-optimal in the context of displacement. Redevelopment of the rail yards and the surrounding parcels of land has the potential to make numerous individuals in the area better off, but the chosen forms of redevelopment would make many people in the neighborhood worse off by violating their revealed preferences for urban forms.

This is the result of how households sort in relation to the provision of local public goods whereby lower income groups are disadvantaged in the urban development process. Because the marginal benefits of one more acre of open space are greater for higher income groups, the optimal use of local land would involve its allocation to wealthier households. However, when the outcome of this reallocation is the displacement of lower income groups, its optimality decreases as this group of individuals is made worse off. For urban development, this means that planners should expect developers to build with urban forms that can improve one individual's position without harming another's. While a union between architectural theory and urban economics could produce this situation, formalist planners[18] have used urban design to fulfill a narrow set of liberally defined social interests, which have historically included economic development and increases in the supply of symbolic capital. If urban planners are to address the social inequalities of their institutional practice, their social objectives must incorporate the design and provision of optimal urban forms.

18 The term "formalist planner" allegorically refers to urban planning bureaucrats who have been institutionally conditioned to prescribe to a formalist approach to cultural objects, à la Heinrich Wolfflinn's *The Principles of Art History,* whereby the formal composition and technique used to create an object is studied without regard to the social context and narrative behind its production.

CONCLUSION:

Conceived as a misplaced suburban development and commercial outlet, the Atlantic Yards plan for urban abstraction harkens back to modernism's superblock and slum clearance programs. The renewed possibility for large-scale redevelopment along these lines has re-emerged after political-economic transformations have altered the development process. The increased availability of capital and the state's heightened involvement in urban development outcomes have both reduced the effectiveness of the public review processes that were implemented in response to the social costs of large-scale slum clearance. These sources of review were intended to help in maintaining equal weight between the various stakeholders within urban planning's strategic territory. Specifically, the Atlantic Yards project avoided the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), which evolved in the effort to give local communities more power over the development process (New York City Department of City Planning).[19] The community groups involved in the Atlantic Yards ULURP would aid in determining the suitability of proposed forms and would also further reveal local preferences for urban forms.

The marginalization of local interests in the development process has resulted from increases in the strategic territory for planning. The first up-scaling, from the urban level to the state level, occurred as cities initially sought the state's validation for the use of eminent domain. The second up-scaling to the national level occurred as political-economic transformations beckoned the federal government's involvement in a new national economy. The most recent up-scaling has extended beyond the nation-unit to further distance local interests from the social objectives that largely determine the outcomes of the urbanization process.

We must question these shifts as we examine our reasons for studying the city. If we study cities to examine how the patterns of social behavior change across space, then we must concern ourselves with the points where those changes have taken place. As such, the broadening of planning's strategic realm causes planning to lose touch with the most basic human interactions that originally give rise to cities. At some point, these shifts will abstract the city's existence from its social reality just as they have done with its physical reality. To prevent this, we must re-assert the importance of local interests in the urbanization process.

19 Because the Atlantic Yards project is being pursued under the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, the ESDC is forced to "comply with the requirements of local laws, ordinances, codes, charters or regulations," except when it "is not feasible or practicable" (Section 16, 3). In this case, the State concluded that local regulations, such as ULURP, were "not feasible or practicable."

Theories on the interests of individuals in relation to urban forms can help reconstitute urban planning's concern for local interests. To this end, this thesis has sought to incorporate theories from economics, architecture, and urban theory to illustrate how social change is facilitated through changing urban forms. Orthodox urban planning cannot reconcile urban form as an agent for social change because it has rarely examined the social significance of urban forms.

Both urban economists and geographers have studied urban forms in relation to patterns of social behavior. Scholars of each discipline have concluded that social inequalities have had something to do with how urban forms structure and have been structured by social interaction. By continuing the study of form we can formulate a new approach to urban planning and development that can change how forms and people relate. The redevelopment of the Atlantic Yards presents an opportunity for this new basis of planning to be implemented. The greater hope is that reform of the urban planning institution will help inhibit the social production of inequality.

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